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Résumé :  La santé joue un rôle de plus en 
plus important dans l'économie dans les 
dernière années: d'une part, on observe une 
amélioration significative du niveau moyen de la 
durée de vie, d'autre part, il y a également une 
forte croissance sur les dépenses de santé. 
Dans cette thèse, on commence par présenter 
ces 2 faits stylisés mais on présente également 
que même s'il y a une amélioration du niveau 
moyen de la durée de vie, l'inégalité de la santé 
est toujours rapportée est en effet a tendance 
d'accroître, on présente aussi que les pays dont 
les dépenses de santé sont assez importantes 
en général n'ont pas un système de santé 
efficace. Par conséquence, cette amélioration 
de la santé humaine semble de bénéficier plus 
les gens qui peuvent payer le coûet. Afin de 
trouver les raisons qui cause ce phénomène et 
proposer des solutions pratiques qui permet de 
résoudre ce problème, dans cette thèse, on 
prend 2 approches :  
premièrement, on commence par l'approche 
déterministe et également l'approche plus 
théorique, dans cette approche, on présente 
notre modèle basé sur le modèle du capital de 
santé du Grossman et on examine comment 
réagissent les agent face à la fluctuation de 
santé, puis on tourne vers le deuxième 
approche, qui est l'approche stochastique et 
également l'approche plus pratique, dans cette 
approche on utilise la chaîne de Markov pour 
simuler un vrai risque de santé et examine 
quelle seront les décisions d'agent de différents 
SES dans cette situation, on agrège ensuite ces 
décisions pour voir l'impact agrégé qui peuvent 
être généré sur l'ensemble de l'économie, 
finalement, on examine comment ces décisions 
peuvent être affectées par des politiques 
publics. 
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Abstract:  During the past 2 decades, health 
has become a more and more important role in 
our economy life: on the one hand, we observe 
a significant improvement of average lifespan 
across the globe, on the other hand, the health 
expenditures are also increasing enormously, 
which has become a shake to the public health 
system of many countries. In this dissertation, 
we begin with these 2 stylized facts but we also 
show that  there is more to it: though the 
average level of health has been improved 
significantly, health related inequalities are still 
being reported and actually tend to increase, 
plus, we also show that countries with important 
health expenditures performs generally poorly in 
terms of health system efficiency, in short, this 
improvement of human health we are talking 
about seems to benefit more those who can pay 
the bills.  
In order to figure out what causes this 
phenomenon and eventually propose practical 
solutions that help solve the problem, in this 
dissertation we take 2 approaches: first we start 
with the deterministic approach and also the 
more theoretical approach, in this approach we 
build our model based on the Grossman health 
capital model and we examine how people 
would behave when their health fluctuates, then 
we turn to the second approach, which is the 
stochastic approach and also the more practical 
approach, in this approach we use the Markov 
chain to simulate the real health risk and 
examine the behaviors of individuals of different 
social-economic status(SES) under this 
circumstance,  we also aggregate these 
behaviors to see what impact could be 
generated on the whole society and we test 
reversely how these behavior would affected by 
public policies. 
 
 
Abstract
Health, as one of the most important indicators of human life, is frequently measured by
the famous self-assessed health status, indeed, health is rather a subjective sentiment than
some objective measurements, uniqueness resides in its very nature. If we are to analyse
health and its impact on human life, it is therefore essential to understand how individual
reacts when their health varies. In this thesis I first focus on individual level to study what
should be their decisions when their health varies, then I aggregate these decisions to see
what impacts could be generated on the whole society. This dissertation is composed of 3
chapters, first I present some stylized facts and do some reviews on existed literatures, I
also propose some questions that I aim to solve by this thesis, then I present 2 models that
contribute to solve the problems that proposed at the end of the first chapter. Results
of this dissertation show that first, a simplified Grossman health capital model with
endogenous lifespan can be constructed, it’s able to replicate a growing profile of health
spending and a significant level of health spending at the end of life, the numerical solution
it produces also fits roughly well the U.S. data, second, an augmented Aiyagari model with
stochastic health shocks can reproduce pretty well some key macroeconomic moments of
health economics, such a model can be therefore used to study the impacts of different
public policies on the whole society: in this study, I compare the differences of public
health policies between France and the U.S., the results show that low unemployment
risk, larger costs of health services and higher risky behaviours contribute to explain the
poorer health of the Americans than French.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
In 2017, the share of health spending on GDP of the U.S. is about 17.2%, by 2020,
this share is expected to reach 20%, of course, among all OECD countries, the U.S. ranks
at the top when we compare the health spending, but even if we look at the bottom of
this list, the countries that rank at the bottom, Mexico and Turkey, still has a significant
level in terms of health spending-GDP ratio at around 5.4% and 4.1% respectively. The
rapid growth of health investment could be related to multiple factors, on the one hand,
progress in medical technology push up the price of health related goods and services,
but the increase in incomes help ease the burden(Suen,2006)[48], on the other hand,
increased life expectancy make households invest more in health while health spending at
elder age is particularly expensive(Hall and Jones(2007)[26], Eric French, J. McCauley,
M. Aragon, et al.(2017)[20]). In any cases, the direct consequence of the rapid growth
of health investment is a shake to public health insurance program: in UK, the National
Health Service(NHS) is reported to be in crisis with ever increasing budget, in the U.S.,
even with limited public health insurance, the financial pressure still make congressional
leaders want to cut Medicare and Medicaid spending, in France, while being regarded as
one of the best in the world, the system l’assurance maladie still face relentless financial
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pressure.
Besides the rapid increasing health spending, another phenomenon is that countries
with high health spending would perform poorly in terms of healthcare system efficiency
and inequalities of health spending are still reported, so it’s natural for us to ask why
health spending becomes so expensive and why this ‘efficiency paradox’, in order to un-
derstand this phenomenon, we have to first understand individual behaviours concerning
health, which are at the core of this phenomenon, that is, it is essential to first understand
2 questions that are lurking behind: first, how to define the value of health? Second, what
influences health? These 2 questions link tightly to individual behaviours: the answer to
the first question decides how an individual values his health in terms of utility, and the
answer to the second question decides how an individual chooses to improve or to sacrifice
his health in order to achieve the maximum of his utility. This dissertation gives our own
perspective to these 2 questions, health is rather a subjective sentiment than some ob-
jective measurements, uniqueness resides in its very nature, personal characteristics(such
as time preferences, risk tolerance, etc.), health status and financial constraints(such as
assets and income) can alter one’s decision when facing health shocks. If we are to un-
derstand the cause of the rapid growth of medical spending, it’s better to start with the
understanding of what makes a person want to invest in health and how would he do it,
after figuring out the key factors in individual’s decision making in health investment, it
is therefore possible to aggregate these decisions made by people from different social-
economic status and estimate the impact they would generate on the whole economy.
This dissertation is composed of 3 independent chapters, the first chapter lays the
ground work for the 2 following chapters, we start with the situation we face nowadays,
in the first part of this chapter, we use some empirical evidences to show the persistent
trend of an increasing health spending and an increasing life expectancy during the last
3 decades among OECD countries, we also reveal that there are actually 2 aspects of this
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increase: overall, for all countries, life expectancy has been largely improved and health
spending has been growing quickly, but when we look at the details, health inequalities
between different social-economic classes exist as always and seem to have been widening,
as a result, we see that, gap in terms of life expectancy has been enlarged between the
high-income class and the low-income class within countries, in terms of health spending,
its growth benefits more the rich while aggravating the burdens on the poor. Afterwards,
we begin to answer the 2 questions discussed above by reviewing literatures, the review
of literatures is undertaken by 2 approach: first the deterministic approach then the
stochastic approach, all these 2 approaches are based on the Grossman health capital
model, the most important idea of this model is the notion of ‘health capital’, the principal
ideas of this notion are: 1) Human health will deteriorate with time but can be ‘repaired’;
2) Unlike other corporate or incorporate assets, health can not be traded, thus the only
option to insure health is via the channel of health spending, either before getting sick
or after, Grossman chooses the former, we define ‘health insurance’ in a similar way in
the latter chapters; 3) Health affects household’s utility by directly presenting in the
utility function; 4) The household has to choose the allocation between medical spending,
consumptions of other commodities and time devoted in either of these 2 actions in order
to maximize his lifetime utilities; 5) As the household ages, the depreciation rate of
health capital will increase so that at some point health capital would eventually fall
below a certain level and the household dies. In the deterministic approach, we first
present a simplified version of the Grossman health capital model, we justify its choices
of simplifications and show the predictions it obtains, but do note that the discussion
presented in this part are mostly theoretical, at the end of this part, we also discuss the
flaws and potential problems that the Grossman model leaves because of its deterministic
nature, in order to bring in the next part, in which we focus on the stochastic approach.
In the stochastic approach, we first discuss the criticisms towards the deterministic nature
of the Grossman model, then we use a simple example to show that a Grossman model
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can be turned into a stochastic one and how the uncertainty would alter the individual’s
decisions.
In the following 2 chapters we discuss our perspectives to the 2 questions proposed
at the beginning, in order to understand how an individual would value health and the
interactions between his behaviours and his health, we first start with the deterministic
perspective, in chapter 3 we discuss the possibility of building a Grossman model with
endogenous lifespan, in this chapter, we study a life-cycle model of health stock and
health spending. We use a simplified version of the Grossman model, where the trade-
off occurs only between the allocation of health investment and consumption of other
commodities. By introducing a non-negative health investment constraint, an explicit
survivability threshold and a strong enough age-dependant health depreciation function,
the model is able to derive optimality conditions with endogenous lifetime, the model
is also numerically solved and we simulate the path followed by main variables over the
agent’s life-cycle. Calibrated on the US economy with realistic values of parameters, the
model is able to replicate a growing profile of health spending and a significant share of
health spending at the end of life roughly in accordance with the data. However, due to
the low elasticity of income with respect to health stock and the lack of a financial market,
we are not able to replicate a hump shaped income profile and a smoothed consumption
profile.
Having confirmed that a model inheriting the spirit of the Grossman model is still
able to replicate individual’s health investment profile over his lifetime, we then move on to
the stochastic approach, in chapter 4 we introduce the Markov chain to simulate a more
realistic health shock and discuss the aggregate impact of individual’s health decisions
but also the impacts of different policies on individual’s health decisions, using France
and US as examples. A general equilibrium model à la Aiyagari (1994)[3] augmented by
investments in health à la Grossman (1972)[23] is used to analyze the market allocations
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of these 2 particular economies. The US is characterized by low unemployment risk,
associated to low unemployment insurance, French is characterized by cheaper health
goods and services and higher benefits of being good health. The turnover on the labour
market in the US is therefore larger than in France. We show that expenditures in health
are strongly related to the labour market turnover leading the American to perceived
their employment spells as a more risky events, therefore reducing their incentives to
invest in health, even when the turnover is principally associated to shorter periods of
unemployment, in other words, the stability of jobs. This contributes to explain the poorer
health of the Americans than French. In addition, counterfactual experiments show that
expensive health related goods and services and risky behaviours are the other 2 main
factors that explain the poorer performance of US healthcare system, indeed, when we
swap the US-style health market by its French counterpart, we find out that there is a
clear improvement in both the health and the welfare of the Americans.
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Chapter 2
Stylized facts and review of
literatures
2.1 Introduction
Without doubt, the average level of human health has been improved significantly:
during the last 3 decades, overall life expectancy has been improved in most countries, in
most developed countries like France, life expectancy at birth increases to 82.4 in 2015
from 75.7 in 1986, in less developed countries like China, life expectancy increases to 76 in
2015 from 68.4 in 1986(OECD,2018). But the word ‘average’ never seems to be accurate
when we look at the details, indeed, average level of human health has been improved, but
it doesn’t necessarily mean that health of every individual has been improved, in this chap-
ter, by empirical data, we show that though the globally improved human health, health
related inequalities are still reported and seem to have been widening. The word ‘inequal-
ity’ could be applied to many aspects, for example, inequality of mortality, inequality of
life expectancy, or inequality of health spending, the last one seem to be mostly intrigu-
ing because of the rapid growth of health spending, it seems like that the improvement
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of human health benefits more of those who can afford it. In order to understand this
phenomenon, we suggest that first we need to understand individual behaviours when it
concerns his own health, individual behaviours are at the core of health spending, if we
can understand how individual of different social-economic status(SES) behave when fac-
ing health risks, we could then proceed to study the impacts and the consequences of this
behaviours. In this chapter, we present 2 approaches: the deterministic approach and the
stochastic approach, the first approach would provide some general ideas and theoretical
basis of how an individual would react to a health fluctuation, the second approach would
show us how to simulate the uncertain nature of health and sickness in real life when we
want to apply our model to a more practical problem. This is the plan for this chapter,
and also the plan we will follow in the whole dissertation, as the aim of this study is to
understand individual behaviours and their aggregate impacts.
In this chapter we begin by reviewing existing literatures, the organisation of this
chapter is as follows: in section 2 we show empirical evidences of health related inequal-
ities, in section 3, section 4 and section 5 we review literatures, which is done through 2
approaches: in the deterministic approach, we choose to focus on reviewing the Grossman
health capital model, in the stochastic approach, we choose to concentrate on showing how
to turn the Grossman model into a stochastic model, finally, in section 6, we conclude.
2.2 The 2 aspects of health inequalities
Health is playing more and more an important role in nowadays economy life, specif-
ically, during the last 3 decades, with the development of iatrology and medical technolo-
gies, two issues emerge in the domain of health economics: the first issue is that, despite
life expectancy in general has increased across the globe, life expectancy inequalities within
countries are still reported between people of different social-economic status(Blaise and
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Lefebvre (2018)[7]). At 30 years old, the life expectancy gap between low and high ed-
ucated male in Europe is equal to 8 years(with a max in Estonia equals to 13.6 years,
and a min in Sweden equals to 4.3 years). For the females, these gaps are lower but
still significant: in average, gap in life expectancy between low and high educated female
weights to 4.1 years(with a max in Estonia equals to 8.6 years and a min in Portugal
equals to 2.3 years).
Men Women
Primary Bachelor Primary Bachelor
education level degree or higher education level degree or higher
Bulgaria 36.3 47.2 45.4 51.9
Czech Republic 35.7 48.3 49.8 52.4
Denmark 45.9 51.6 50.8 54.3
Estonia 34.9 48.5 45.9 54.5
Finland 46.1 51.5 52.4 55.8
France 46.8 53.1 54.1 57.1
Hungary 36.4 48.1 46.6 51.9
Italy 49 53.5 54.4 57.2
Norway 47.7 52.4 52.1 55.7
Poland 37.9 44.2 49.1 54.2
Portugal 47.5 52.6 54.1 56.4
Romania 38.1 46.3 48.1 51.2
Sweden 48.5 52.8 52 55.5
Average 42.4 50.4 50.4 54.5
Table 2.1: Europeans life expectancies at 30 years old between people of different educa-
tion levels(Blaise and Lefebvre (2018)[7])
In the U.S. it’s the same thing, health gaps between different social-economic gradi-
ents still exists and seem to have been widened, people with high education level in general
live longer than those with low education level: between 1990 and 2010, disparities in life
expectancy caused by education levels increase across all gender and race groups(Sasson
(2016)[43]), the difference in life expectancy between the least educated white women and
the most educated white women increases from 2.5 to 9.3 years, the difference between
the most educated black women and the least educated black women also increases but a
little bit smaller from 1.9 to 4.7 years, the life expectancy gap is even larger among men:
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from 6.1 to 11.9 years for white men and from 6.9 to 8.6 years for black men between
1990 and 2010. An decrease of life expectancy is also observed among the least educated
white people between 1990 to 2010 while all other groups have at least an increase in life
expectancy during the same period. As generally we consider that a higher education
level leads to a higher ability to get high revenue and thus a better social-economic sta-
tus, we can also say that this result suggests a strong and positive relationship between
social-economic status and life expectancy.
Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black
Women Men Women Men
Education(yrs.) 1990 2010 1990 2010 1990 2010 1990 2010
0-11 54 50.9 46 45.4 49.9 51.8 39.6 45.5
12 55.1 55.9 48.7 50.5 49.2 52.7 41.4 46.5
13-15 55.2 56.7 49.7 52.8 49.6 54.2 43.1 50.9
16+ 56.5 60.2 52.1 57.3 51.8 56.5 46.5 54.1
Table 2.2: U.S. life expectancy at age 25 between 1990 and 2010(Sasson (2016)[43])
Income, as another indicator of social-economic status, is also proved to be positively
related to longevity, in Europe, differences in life expectancy have been reported between
people who have the highest revenue and people who have the lowest revenue: in France,
for men in age cohort 30 to 34, the life expectancy gap between people who have the
highest revenue and people who have the lowest revenue is roughly 20 years, in Sweden,
for the same group of people, this gap is remarkably reduced but still exists at around 10
years(Blaise and Lefebvre (2018)[7]). In the U.S., gap in life expectancy caused by income
has been widened since 2001, though life expectancy increases across all income quartiles,
life expectancy grows 2.5 times faster for the wealthiest people than for the poorest
people(Chetty, Stepner, Abraham et al. (2016)[11]). Consequently, the increase of life
expectancy seems to benefit more people with high education level and high revenues. Last
but not least, another interesting finding is that the marginal increase of life expectancy
by revenue decreases with revenue, that is, a concave relationship between revenue and
longevity(Blaise and Lefebvre (2018)[7]).
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Annual income quartile 2001 2014 Annual increase(yrs.)
1st($17000) 76 77.2 0.08
2nd($47000) 80 81.8 0.12
3rd($87000) 82.2 84.9 0.18
4th($256000) 85 88 0.2
Table 2.3: Life expectancy at birth by income, U.S., 2001-2014(Chetty, Stepner, Abraham
et al. (2016)[11])
Overall, during the last 3 decades, though this progress seems to stop after 20141, life
expectancy increases substantially with in average an increment of 8 years(OECD,2018),
but it clearly benefits more people in high social-economic gradient, as we see that health
gap between high social-economic gradient and low social-economic gradient remains al-
ways large and actually tends to increase.
Figure 2.1: Life expectancy across countries,1970-2016(OECD,2018)
1OECD data shows that the average life expectancy of all countries in its database reaches its peak
in 2014 at 78.9 years, then in 2015 it drops to 78.8 years, furthermore, JY HO and AS Hendi (2018)[28]
also reports a decline of life expectancy in most high income countries after 2014.
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The second issue is the rapidly rising health expenditures. In 1990, the average
health expenditure share of GDP across all OECD countries is about 6.5%, this number
rises to 8.81% in 2017. Rapid growth of health spending among OECD countries have
been reported, in the U.S. the health-GDP ratio rises most quickly from 8.2% in 1980
to 11.3% in 1990 and to 17.1% in 2013, in Japan this share rises relatively slow, from
6.2% in 1980 to 10.8% in 2013, in France, the growth of health expenditure is relatively
not so quick(compared to the U.S.) but the number itself is still too large to ignore, with
6.7% in 1990 to 11.4% in 2013(OECD,2018). Squires and Anderson (2015)[46] compare
the health expenditures of 13 high-income countries and find out that health spending
generally grows quickly during the last 3 decades and by 2013, the health-GDP ratio in
all 13 studied countries reach around at least 10%. Table 2.4 shows the updated data
by OECD 2018 database and Squires and Anderson(2015)’s data of the 13 high-income
countries, we see the differences are small and indeed by 2013, among the 13 countries,
health spending represents at least roughly 10% of their GDP.
Percentage of health Squires and Anderson’s
cares on GDP Data
Country 1980 1990 2000 2013 2013
Australia 5.8 6.5 7.6 8.8 9.4
Canada 6.6 8.4 8.1 10.1 10.7
Denmark 8.4 8 8.1 10.2 11.1
France 6.7 8 9.5 11.4 11.6
Germany 8.1 8 9.8 10.9 11.2
Japan 6.2 5.8 7.2 10.8 10.2
Netherlands 6.6 6.9 7.1 10.9 11.1
New Zealand 5.8 6.7 7.5 9.4 11
Norway 5.4 7.1 7.7 8.9 9.4
Sweden 7.8 7.3 7.4 11.1 11.5
Switzerland 6.6 7.9 9.8 11.3 11.1
United Kingdom 5.1 5.1 6 9.8 8.8
United States 8.2 11.3 12.5 16.3 17.1
Table 2.4: Total Health Care Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
between 1980-2013, by OECD country(OECD,2018, Squires and Anderson (2015)[46])
But higher health spending doesn’t necessarily bring better health system, Squires
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and Anderson (2015)[46] uses the U.S. as an example to illustrate that though the U.S.
spends more than than twice the OECD median per capita, its health system still per-
forms badly in terms of medical outcomes such as life expectancy or mortality rate as a
result lethal diseases such as cancer and heart diseases. By Squires and Anderson (2015)’s
data[46], if we compare the U.S. with France, which has a far better performance health
system, we can see that despite of spending doubled health expenditures per capita($9086
vs $4361) and 4 times more out-of-pocket health expenditures($1074 vs $277), the Amer-
icans live in average 4 years less than the French people(78.8 vs 82.3) and have a similar
mortality rate as a result of cancer but 3 times higher when the mortality rate is related
to ischemic heart disease.
Per Capita Per Capita Out-of-pocket
Country Health expenditures(US$) Health expenditures(US$)
Australia 4115 771
Canada 4569 623
Denmark 4847 625
France 4361 277
Germany 4920 649
Japan 3713 503
Netherlands 5131 270
New Zealand 3855 420
Norway 6170 855
Sweden 5153 726
Switzerland 6325 1630
United Kingdom 3364 321
United States 9086 1074
OECD median 3661 625
Table 2.5: Per Capita Health Care Expenditures, by OECD country:2013(Squires and
Anderson (2015)[46])
Thus efficiency of health system needs to be checked to see if it’s indeed in some high
health spending countries a relative important part of health expenditures are spent for
nothing. In this thesis we choose to focus on the U.S. and France, since the 2 countries have
similar average life expectancies but health spending in the U.S. far exceeds that in France.
To examine the efficiency, Data Envelopment Analysis(DEA) is frequently applied(Afonso
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and Aubyn (2004)[2], Afonson and Kazemi (2016)[1], Cetin and Bahce (2016)[8], Önen
and Sayin (2018)[39]), the DEA methodology is a linear programming method for evaluat-
ing the relative efficiencies of Decision Making Units(DMUs) who produce output(s) using
similar inputs, the method is originally designed to evaluate the efficiency of an Ameri-
can federal program “Follow through”(Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978)[9]), then it’s
generalised to be applied in various sectors including health economics. In the domain
of health, the mostly used outputs would be Life Expectancy(LE) and Infant Mortality
Rate(IMR), as for the mostly used inputs, there are 2 types: either physical inputs such as
number of beds, number of physicians and nurses, or monetary inputs such as per capita
health expenditures and health spending-GDP ratio.
The DEA methodology has been widely used in the domain of health2, Afonso and
Kazemi (2017)[1] calculate DEA efficiency scores of healthcare system of 20 OECD coun-
tries between 2009 and 2013, using both CCR and BCC model, they use normalized health
expenditures as the only input and LE and IMR as outputs. Here we only show the results
that we are concerned with, complete results are presented in the Appendix C. According
to their results, under BCC, France and the U.S. have a similar input-oriented efficiency
score, with the U.S. a little bit higher at 0.77 and France a little bit lower at 0.741, sug-
gesting that in terms of input efficiency, both countries are considered as inefficient and
they should have been able to reduce around 25% of their inputs to produce their ouputs
compare to the input efficiency of their own pairs, under CCR, France gets an even lower
score at 0.694 while the input-oriented efficiency score for the U.S. doesn’t change much,
which equals to 0.76, suggesting that the scale efficiency is larger for France than for the
U.S.. Cetin and Bahce (2016)[8] obtain a similar conclusion, they use the classic CCR
model and include not only financial factors such as per capita health expenditures but
also physical factors such as number of doctors and nurses as inputs, according to their
2Detailed presentation of the DEA method can be seen in Appendix A and in Appendix B.
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results, France obtains an input-oriented efficiency score of 0.739, which is lower than that
of the U.S. which is of 0.782, plus, these authors also report that France is of nature DRS
and the U.S. is of nature IRS, suggesting that France has already passed their optimal
input size and the U.S. hasn’t yet reached their optimal input size. These 2 literatures
both seem to suggest that France is worse than the U.S. in terms of input-oriented effi-
ciency, which is a little contradictory to the data we presented before, since the Americans
do spend much more on health than French people but have a worse or at most similar
overall health status than French people. This contradiction could be caused by multi-
ple reasons: 1) First of all, the efficiency score obtained by the DEA methodology may
not be able to be directly used in comparaison, since for each inefficient unit, their pairs
could be different, in the article of Afonso and Kazemi (2017)[1], for France, its pairs are
Switzerland and Luxembourg under BCC and Ireland under CCR, for the U.S., its pairs
is Ireland both under BCC and under CCR, thus at least we would say that under BCC
the input-oriented efficiency scores of these 2 countries may not be able to be directly
compared. This is also the case in the article of Cetin and Bahce (2016)[8], in this article,
France’s pairs are Chile, Korea and Slovenia, for the U.S., its pairs are Chile, Iceland
and Ireland; 2) The second reason could be that by definition, the DEA methodology
measures only the efficiency, so a country with relatively poor health outcomes but using
also relatively low inputs could also be considered as efficient, for example, according to
Cetin and Bahce (2016)’s[8] study, Chile is considered as one of the efficient countries, but
according to their database(OECD,2012), life expectancy of Chile is lower than that of
France(78.7 vs 82.1) and infant mortality rate(per 1000 live birth) of Chile is more than
double than that of France(7.4 vs 3.5), yet Chile is considered as efficient because of its
relatively low input(7% of GDP) according to the DEA methodology but France is not.
But between France and the U.S. this doesn’t seem to be the case, so this contradiction
we discussed here might be caused by another reason; 3) The third one could be that, in
fact, since by definition the DEA methodology is designed to maximise the ratio between
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the weighted output and the weighted input for a particular unit, so the DEA method-
ology does have the possibility to overemphasize an unit’s strengths while ignoring its
weakness by giving its weakness a low or even 0 weight, thus additional restrictions on
weights might be proposed, but this is not the case in both Afonso and Kazemi (2017)’s[1]
work and in Cetin and Bahce (2016)’s[8] work. Since in the article of Afonso and Kazemi
(2017)[1], in terms of health, there is only 1 input thus it might not be a problem, but in
the article of Cetin and Bahce (2016)[8] there are both financial input and physical input,
hence it could be possible when evaluating the U.S., weights of physical factors might be
overemphasized and weights of financial factors might be underemphasized; 4) The last
reason could a biased using of data, in fact, Afonso and Kazemi (2017)[1] aim to evaluate
government’s performance in various sectors, so the health expenditure-GDP ratio they
use might not refer to the total health expenditures but only the public health expendi-
tures, in this sense, France government do expenses more than the U.S. government since
the U.S. still yet to have a full health care system. Therefore, the U.S. could be more
efficient than France in terms of input-oriented efficiency because of this ‘advantage’ but
also the second reason we mentioned above.
Nevertheless, in terms of output-oriented efficency, France does perform better than
the U.S.: using the BCC model, Afonso and Kazemi (2017)[1] also calculate the outpu-
oriented efficiency score for OECD countries, according to their retults, France has an
output-oriented efficiency score of 0.992 and its pairs is Japan, the U.S. has an output-
oriented score of 0.972 and its pairs is also Japan, suggesting that though both France
and the U.S. are still considered as inefficient, France healthcare system performs better
than that of the U.S. in terms of medical outcomes. The 2 scores do seem close but
note that according to Afonso and Kazemi (2017)[1], 0.972 makes the U.S. rank at the
very bottom among all 20 studied OECD countries while 0.992 gives France a better
ranking at 9th, Önen and Sayin (2018)[39] reaches the same conclusion as they calculate
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the efficiency scores of OCED countries with their output-oriented DEA model, they only
take physical factors such as number of physicians, number of nurses and number hospital
beds as inputs and take LE and IMR as outputs, they also add additional restrictions
on weights to alleviate the overemphasising and underemphasising problem we mentioned
above: concerning the weights of outputs, for an output term ysk, they introduce both
an upper and a lower bound of the proportion of this particular weighted output usysk to
the overall weighted output of unit k
Ls ≤
usysk∑S
r=1 uryrk
≤ Us
in terms of inputs, they add similar restrictions on input weights vi. They call this
new form of DEA model(BCC+restrictions on weights) as ARG model, they then use
both BCC and ARG model to evaluate the output-oriented efficiency score of 34 OECD
countries both in 2008 and in 2012. In general output-oriented efficiency scores are lower in
the ARG model than in the BCC model, which is normal since the ARG model introduces
more restrictions on weights. Here we present only the latest results of their work, full
results could be seen in Appendix C. By their calculation, in 2012, France has an efficiency
score of 0.991 under BCC and 0.658 under ARG, which are both higher than the U.S. who
only gets 0.966 as an efficiency score under BCC and 0.565 under ARG. So these results
by Önen and Sayin (2018)[39] also suggest that France outperforms the U.S. in terms of
medical outcome efficiency but do note that in their work the reference set for France and
for the U.S. are different, for example, under ARG, in 2012, the reference set of France is
composed of Slovenia and Iceland and the reference set of the U.S. is composed of Chile,
Iceland and Slovenia.
Overall, though the DEA methodology could be questioned and the scores obtained
by this method might not be able to be directly used in comparison, we are at least safe
to say that health care system in France and in the U.S. are rather inefficient, both input-
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oriented and output-oriented. France and the U.S. enlist certainly among the countries
with highest health expenditures, but as we have discussed above, they certainly not enlist
among countries with most efficient healthcare systems. This ‘efficiency paradox’ could
lead to inequalities of health spending since the health related goods and services would
be so expensive that only the rich could afford, indeed, inequalities of health spending
have been reported in the U.S.: before ACA(Affordable Care Act)’s passage in 2010, 39%
of Americans with below-average income admit that the sole reason that they don’t go
see a doctor is the cost, yet even after ACA’s expansion of health insurance coverage,
27 million Americans still remain uninsured and most of them have annual incomes near
or below the official poverty line(Dickman, Himmelstein and Woolhandler (2017)[16]).
In addition, in the private insurance market, the premium has increased substantially,
in 2016, the average premium for family coverage rise to $18142, which has increased
58% since 2006(Claxton, Rae, Long, Damico and Sawyer (2016)[12]), more than 80% of
employer-based insurance plans include an certain amount of money that a insured must
pay before his insurer covers the rest, in 2016, this amount of money in average weights
$1478, 2.5 times higher than in 2006. The rising costs of having medical treatments leads
predictably a decline use of health services by the poor, and doctors and hospitals would
eventually fill their empty appointment slots and beds with people who can afford the
costs(Dickman, Himmelstein and Woolhandler (2017)[16]). The situation is much better
in France with a universal health insurance that aims at allowing every individual living
in France to get access to the minimum health care, indeed, by French healthcare system,
the poor benefits more than the rich: 90% of the costs of medical treatments are covered
for the poorest, compared to less than 70% coverage for the rich, out-of-pocket health
spending ranges from 4% for the poor to 13% for the rich(Nay et al. (2016)[38]). Yet
inequalities still exists: based on the survey of ESPS, 15.8% of interviewees declare that
they have to give up looking for medical treatments because of financial reasons(Dourgnon
et al. (2012)[17]) and the wealthiest 50% people are reported to see specialists 2 times
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more frequently than do the poorest 25%(Or, Jusot and Yilmaz (2012)[33]). Nevertheless,
even excluding the U.S., inequalities on access to care seems to be a universal phenomenon,
Devaux and Looper (2012)[15] report that in 19 major OECD countries, there exists a
clear-cut on need-adjusted doctor visit frequency between high-income people and low-
income people, this gap is even larger when consider need-adjusted specialist visit such
as dentist visit or cancer screening, France ranks at the median according to this report
and inequalities in healthcare utilisation has been clearly justified, for example, though
France ranks at the top in overall need-adjusted doctor visit frequency, there is still a
10% gap between the utilisation frequency of high-income people and that of low-income
people, when consider need-adjusted specialist visit, this gap is widened to 24%.
In general, we see a rapid increase of health expenditures across the globe, but this
trend doesn’t seem to make countries with high health expenditures necessarily efficient,
furthermore, inequalities of health expenditures are still reported. With longer lifespan
and widened health gap, we see a need of economists in the domain of health: it’s thus
necessary, and it’s up to economists to model the economy of health, to understand the
determinants when it comes to decisions concerning health and to figure out the differences
between health policies in different countries and their impacts.
2 fundamental questions lie in the center of answering these needs: first of all, how to
define the value of health? Secondly, what influences health? In the rest of this chapter,
we try to respond to these questions by works that have been previously done: there are
essentially 2 approaches of modelling individual behaviours when their health fluctuates,
either by the deterministic approach or the stochastic approach, we will review them
separately. We also dig more deeply to show the flaws of the original Grossman model:
its potential permission of infinite lifespan and its deterministic nature that doesn’t suit
properly the uncertain nature of the health risk, these are also the reasons why we first
start with the deterministic approach and then turn to the stochastic approach.
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2.3 A simplified interpretation of the Grossman model
Up to today, The Grossman model [23] still holds an iconic position in terms of health
economy, but it is such a complex model that even Grossman himself needs to divide the
model into 2 branches3 in order to explain the individual’s optimal stock of health capital
and individual’s optimal health investment decisions. In fact, in Grossman (1972)[23], in
order to simplify the theoretical analysis and to contrast hunman health with other forms
of human capital, Grossman uses only the pure investment model, however it’s important
to include both 2 benefits of health(consumption benefits and investment benefits) in the
analysis of individual behaviours on health investment since leaving out either 1 of these
2 benefits will ultimately alter individual’s decisions. In this section, in order to illustrate
mode clearly the trajectory of individual’s optimal health stock and correspondingly the
trajectory of individual’s health decisions overtime, we would use a simplified version of
the Grossman model by Laporte (2015)[34] which includes both benefit components as
the full Grossman model.
Laporte (2015)[34] takes the continuous time optimal control approach to analyse
the Grossman model, and phase diagrams are drawn to present the optimal trajectory
of individual’s stock of health and health investment. The model could be presented as
below:
Utility function The utility function in Laporte (2015)[34] could be written as
max
∫ T
0
U(Ct, Ht)e
−ρtdt (2.1)
3Grossman divides his model into 2 different branches: one is the pure invesment model and the other
is the pure consumption model, in the former branch Grossman assumes that only the monetary aspect
of heatlh matters, in the latter branch Grssoman assumes that only the psychic aspect of heatlh takes
effect.
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where C denotes the non health-related consumption and H denotes the stock of health
capital, ρ denotes the subjective discount factor. In addition, Laporte assumes that
UC > 0, UCC < 0, UH > 0, UHH < 0, so individual’s utility function is concave on C and
H, finally, Laporte assumes that UCH > 0.
T is assumed to be the finite length of individual’s lifespan, which is quite an unreal-
istic assumption since it suggests that individual would have full control on their lifespan,
we shall return to this point later on.
Motion of health capital Health evolves essentially in the same way than in the
original Grossman model, by the following equation
H˙ = G(I)− δH (2.2)
where G(I) is the production function of health capital, G(I) is supposed to be instan-
taneous, which follows the instantaneous health production hypothesis in the original
Grossman model, plus, Laporte also assumes that GI > 0, GII ≤ 0 and G(0) = 0, thus
the production function of health investment is supposed to have a positive marginal
productivity. H˙ represents therefore the net investment in health, with G(I) the gross
investment and δ the health depreciation rate, as we can see, health depreciation rate
is assumed to be constant, which actually leaves window for immortality, given that the
technology of health investment production is sufficiently efficient, we shall discuss this
point later.
The budget constraint Laporte assumes an instantaneous budget constraint instead
of a lifetime budget constraint from the original Grossman model. His budget constraint
could be written as
Y (0) + Y (H) = Ct + pIIt (2.3)
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where health investment I is defined as a commodity that can be directly purchased from
the market at price pI , the price of C is set to be 1. There is no production function of
health investments as in the original Grossman model, plus, I is also supposed to be non-
negative(I ≥ 0). Y (0) denotes the part of income that is independent of the individual’s
health and Y (H) denotes that part of income that depends on the individual’s health, in
addition, Laporte assumes a diminishing effect of health on Y (H), that is YH > 0 and
YHH < 0.
There is no time constraint in Laporte’s version, the reason of this simplification is
that in this article, Laporte chooses to focus more on the inter-temporal issue, instead of
picking up choices among different health investment strategies, in addition, health capital
conceived in this article is defined in a more general sense as “. . . Health capital is best
thought of as relating to the individual’s ability to resist disease, and to perform what the
health care literature refers to as activities of daily life. . . ”, to this extent, health capital
has no need to be tied with healthy days within a certain period of time, the individual
receives higher utilities because of being able to live in good health rather than having
more days being healthy, therefore in this version of the Grossman model, time is excluded
as an input variable and there is also no need for the time constraint as in the original
Grossman model.
The individual’s problem The individual’s problem could be written as
max
∫ T
0
U(Ct, Ht)e
−ρtdt (2.4)
subject to 

Y (0) + Y (H) = Ct + pIIt
H˙ = G(I)− δH
I ≥ 0
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The Lagrangian could be hence written as
L = U(Y (0) + Y (H)− pII,H) + φ[G(I)− δH] + λI (2.5)
where Eq 2.5 substitute C using the budget constraint. In this formulation, φ denotes
the shadow price of health capital, thus the marginal benefit of 1 unit of H, lmabdaI is
the Kuhn-Tucker expression, when I > 0, λ = 0, when I = 0, λ > 0.
The problem could be easily solve, Laporte writes the first of the Pontryagin necessary
conditions as
∂L
∂I
= −pIUC + φGI(I) (2.6)
which gives out the interior equilibrium solution of I
pIUC = φGI(I) (2.7)
The LHS of Eq 2.7 shows the marginal benefit of 1 unit of I, for it’s the product of
the marginal product of health investment, GI , times the shadow price of health capital,
φ; the RHS shows the marginal cost of I, for it’s the product of reduction of consumption
of 1 unit plus of I, pI , times the marginal utility of consumption, Uc4.
Now differentiate Eq 2.5 with respect to H, we can write
∂L
∂H
= UH + UCYH − φδ = 0 (2.8)
combining Eq 2.7 and Eq 2.8 we can obtain the equilibrium condition
UH + UCYH = pIUC ×
δ
GI
(2.9)
4Since the price of I is pI , 1 unit of I would therefore cost pI , as the price of C is set to be 1, thus 1
unit increase in I would be matched by pI units of C, in other words, the opportunity cost of I.
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Eq 2.9 actually reveals a major problem of Laporte’s model, which is that it still
permits individuals to live forever, as we can see, the LHS shows the marginal benefits of
every unit of health produced by health investment, yet for every unit of increase in H, δ
units will be depreciated over time, and thus requires δ
GI
units of I invested to repair the
loss, that’s to say, at the optimum, Eq 2.9 suggests that the loss of health should always
be fully repaired by health investment, and given that δ is hold constant, this might not
be so implausible, in this sense, Laporte’s model actually suggests that at the optimum
the individual would simply live forever.
After justifying the simplifications he make in his version of the Grossman model,
Laporte then sets out to show several predictions that could be obtained using his model,
in other words, the predictions that should be obtained by the Grossman model.
Stationary loci of I and H The one-state variable form of his model allows Laporte
to use the phase diagram to present the stationary loci of I and H and eventually the
optimal trajectories of health capital and of health investments.
Thus the first step is to draw the stationary loci of I and H. By definition, the
stationary locus of I is defined by I˙ = 0 and similarly the stationary locus of H is defined
by H˙ = 0.
To be able to draw the stationary loci of I and H, Laporte further assumes that
G(I) = I, which also suggests a CRS technique on health production, as in the original
Grossman model. Therefore, Eq 2.2 becomes
H˙ = I − δH (2.10)
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thus the stationary locus of H becomes a straight line
I = δH (2.11)
the phase arrows of H can be therefore found by ∂H˙
∂I
= 1 > 0 and ∂H˙
∂H
= −δ < 0.
Concerning the stationary locus of I, first write the Hamiltonian as
H = U(Y (0) + Y (H)− pII,H) + φ(I − δH) (2.12)
The Pontryagin necessary condition with respect to I would be
∂H
∂I
= −pIUC + φ = 0 (2.13)
The second of Pontryagin’s necessary conditions is
φ˙ = ρφ−HH (2.14)
= ρφ− [UCYH + UH − δφ] (2.15)
Total differentiating Eq 2.13 with respect to time and substituting Eq 2.10 and Eq
2.14, we would get an equation of I˙
I˙ =
pI [UCH + UCCYH ][I − δH] + [UCYH + UH ]− [ρ+ δ]pIUC
p2IUCC
(2.16)
at the intersection point of stationary locus of I and H, i.e. I˙ = H˙ = 0, the above
equation becomes
I˙ =
[UCYH + UH ]− [ρ+ δ]pIUC
p2IUCC
(2.17)
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The stationary locus of I is defined by I˙ = 0, thus the slope of the stationary locus
of I could be written as
∂I
∂H
=
[ρ+ 2δ][UCH + UCCYH ]− [UCCY
2
H + 2UCHYH + UCYHH + UHH ]
[ρ+ δ]p2IUCC
(2.18)
assuming that UCH + UCCYH > 0 and also assume the second term in square bracket is
negative5, thus the slope of the stationary locus of I is negative, the phase arrows of I
can be found by ∂I˙
∂I
> 0 and ∂I˙
∂H
> 0, hence the phase diagram of the problem could be
drawn as Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: The phase diagram
Figure 2.2 shows the stationary locus of both I and H, I˙ = 0 and H˙ = 0, the in-
tersection of these 2 locus(point E) is therefore referred as the equilibrium point. Every
5It means that the overall marginal utility of health stock is diminishing when both of its effect on
income and its direct effect on utility are accounted in the same time.
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trajectory in this phase diagram is by definition an optimal trajectory since the phase dia-
gram is drawn using first order conditions, we see as well that there are only 2 trajectories
that would converge to the equilibrium, referred as the stable branches, and also only
2 trajectories that would diverge directly from the equilibrium, referred as the unstable
branches, other trajectories will first move toward the equilibrium but then diverge from
it.
Point E is referred as the equilibrium point, but mostly in terms of macroeconomics,
since on the microeconomic level, it usually takes forever for an individual to converge to
the equilibrium, which no one has ever achieved. Thus the individual’s optimal trajectory
would not include this equilibrium, as what we show in Figure 2.2 by the curved trajectory.
Since on the microeconomic level point E can not be reached in an finite amount of time,
an specific endpoint condition has to be chosen in order to obtain a solution, Laporte
chooses a fixed endpoint Hmin as in the original Grossman model, meaning that once the
individual’s health capital falls to Hmin, he dies.
The curved trajectory in Figure 2.2 hence shows a typical case of the Grossman
model: given the initial health H0 and the fixed length of life T (recall that for now T is
still fixed and known in advance), the individual should choose a trajectory of (I,H) that
would bring him from H0 to Hmin during T time periods, since he starts with a rather
high H0, thus initially he choose a low I, which would make his H fall, then he chooses
to increase his I, slowing down the rate of depreciation of his H, afterwards, when his I
increases to a certain level, which is shown in Figure 2.2 by the point where the curved
trajectory cuts the stationary loci of I, he chooses to let his I fall again, and this would
eventually make his H decreases to Hmin at T .
Effects of income Using the phase diagram, Laporte illustrates the effects of social
factors(income or human capital)on the individual’s optimal health stock and health in-
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vestment decisions. In order to do so, he first further assumes that Y (H) is dropped from
the constraint budget, therefore individuals with different level of incomes Y (0) will still
have the same equation of motion for health.
Concerning the stationary locus of H, it should not be affected by a higher Y (0), for
it simply suggests that I = δH.
However, concerning the stationary locus of I, Eq 2.17 becomes
I˙ =
UH − [ρ+ δ]pIUC
p2IUCC
(2.19)
for I˙ = 0 it needs UH − [ρ+ δ]pIUC = 0, hence we can eventually obtain
∂I
∂Y (0)
=
UHC − [ρ+ δ]pIUCC
pIUHC − p2IUCC [ρ+ δ]
=
1
pI
> 0 (2.20)
Eq 2.20 shows that even the individual’s income has no effect on potential health
investment and thus future health, an increase in Y (0) will still pushes up I, in economic
terms this can be explained by the fact that an increase of Y (0) will increase also C for
any given point of I, thus the opportunity cost of increasing I decreases for the marginal
utility of consumption UC becomes smaller.
Figure 2.3 shows the effect of an increase in Y (0), the new stationary locus of I and
the new optimal trajectory are represented by the dashed line. We can see clearly that
higher Y (0) shifts up the stationary locus of I, thus pushes up the equilibrium point but
also make an individual with the same initial health capital invest more in health.
The optimal length of life Now let’s discuss the optimal length of life. In Laporte’s
version, as in the original Grossman model, the individual’s lifespan T is assumed to be
known in advance and the health depreciation rate δ is considered as constant, given a CRS
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Figure 2.3: The effect of an higher income
health production function, these 2 assumptions would eventually make an individual live
forever, given an enough sufficient health production technology, even if it wasn’t this case,
having full control on one’s life is already beyond realism, Grossman [24] addresses to this
issue, the solution he provides is to turn δ variable so that health capital will depreciate
more and more severely as the individual ages, this seems to be a reasonable way to imitate
the collapsing process of human health, but how δ varies with age needs to be carefully
chosen to make sure that the speed of collapsing would be neither too quick nor too slow,
we follow this path in chapter 3 and show how we set the equation of motion of δ so
that the virtual individuals in our model have a finite and endogenous lifespan. Another
criticism towards this method is that, as Laporte argues, even δ increases with age, it
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still leaves window for the possibility of living forever, assuming a really enough sufficient
health production technology, if it was true, it basically suggests that the existence of a
somehow magical health treatment technology that would be able to repair human body
instantly, no matter how high the health depreciation rate would be at the end of life,
which, as we can see, turns to be actually another beyond-realism assumption.
But this method proposed above only ease the worries toward the constant δ issue,
the other one, as Zweifel (2012)[49] argues, knowing the length of life is still pretty much
unrealistic, yet because of the deterministic nature of the Grossman model, this seems to
be unavoidable. Laporte argues that this assumption would rather be not so unreasonable
in terms of empirical investigation, but admits that this problem needs to be dealt with
since it really doesn’t make any sense on the theoretical level. Laporte then propose 2
options to fix this problem:
• Either we assume a maximum length of life but the actual lifespan is endogenous,
the optimal life length is chosen under condition that the Hamiltonian at this end
of life equals to 0. In chapter 3, we choose this option, without stepping too early
into the stochastic domain, since that’s what we do in the fourth chapter. ;
• Either we take the stochastic approach, by making the health evolution random, as
what we do in the fourth chapter. In the second to last section of this chapter, we
shall present a simple example of this approach, as a prelude or an introduction to
the fourth chapter, in this section, we shall see how the introduction of health risk
would alter the agent’s decisions.
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2.4 Justification of the lack of financial market in La-
porte’s model
In this section we shall discuss the justifications for the simplifications Laporte made
in his version of the Grossman model, since this model also serves as a basic model in
chapter 3, these justifications also would provide a firm standpoint to which extent we
build our own version of the Grossman model.
The previous section presents the basic layout of Laporte’s simplified version of the
Grossman model, as we can see, there are 2 major differences if we compare this version
and the original one: first of all, there is no time constraint, as we have already discussed,
Laporte chooses this simplification because he focus more on the intertemporal issue and
the health capital is defined differently from the original Grossman model, we inherent this
idea in chapter 3 for these very same reasons, in our version of the Grossman model, there
is also no constraint on detailed time allocations, the second major difference is that there
is no financial market, Laporte doesn’t provide too much details on this simplification,
thus we shall provide our own version to justify this choice since in chapter 3 our model
also doesn’t include a financial market.
Let us assume a similar setting of environment like Laporte, except for now there
exists a financial market, the interest rate is denoted as r. Let us also suggest that the
exogenous part of income Y (0) is dropped out, thus the individual’s income depends
completely on his health capital defined by the equation below
Y (H) = θHα
where θ and α are 2 exogenous constants. Plus, α are supposed to be less than 1.
Production function of health G(I) is supposed to be equal to I for simplicity, for
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the same purpose we also suppose that the individual only lives 2 periods, with the initial
health capital H1 given, the individual’s problem could be therefore written as
maxU(C1, H1) + βU(C2, H2)
subject to 

H2 = I1 + (1− δ)H1
θHα1 = C1 + I1 + S1
θHα2 + (1 + r)S1 = C2
The Lagrangian is written as
L = U(C1, H1) + βU(C2, H2) + φH [H2 − I1 − (1− δ)H1]
+ φA,1(C1 + I1 + S1 − θH
α
1 )
+ φA,2(C2 − θH
α
2 − (1 + r)S1)
where φH and φA are the shadow price of health and assets.
Differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to C1, H2, I1 and S1, we get
∂L
∂C1
= UC1 + φA,1 = 0
∂L
∂H2
= βUH2 + φH − φA,2θαH
α−1
2 = 0
∂L
∂I1
= −φH + φA,1 = 0
∂L
∂S1
= φA,1 − φA,2(1 + r) = 0
combining these first order conditions we get the equilibrium condition
UC1 = β[UH2 +
UC1
1 + r
θαHα−12 ] (2.21)
Now let’s apply the method used by Grossman in his original article: let us also divide
34
our example into 2 branches, first we assume the health capital has (almost) no impact on
the income, which corresponds to the pure consumption branch of the Grossman model,
then we assume that the health capital doesn’t enter directly into the utility function,
which corresponds to the pure investment branch of the Grossman model. In addition, in
order to illustrate concretely the situation, we also assume that the utility function takes
the form
U(C,H) = µ ln(C) + (1− µ) ln(H) (2.22)
To neutralize the effect of health capital on the income, we assume that α = 0, in
this case, Rq 2.21 becomes
UC1 = βUH2 (2.23)
By the first order conditions that give us Eq 2.21 we still have UC1 = β(1 + r)UC2 ,
let us also substitute U(C,H) by Eq 2.23, thus we can write


µ
C1
= β(1 + r) µ
C2
µ
C1
= β 1−µ
H2
(2.24)
Since α = 0, the budget constraint is reduced to
C1 +
C2
1 + r
+ I1 =
θ
1 + r
+ θ = W (2.25)
Substituting Eq 2.24 into Eq 2.25 and the law of motion of health capital, finally we
can obtain
C1 =
µ
µ+ β
[W + (1− δ)H1] (2.26)
and
C2 = β(1 + r)C1 =
µ(β(1 + r))
µ+ β
[W + (1− δ)H1] (2.27)
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and
I1 =
1− µ
µ
βC1 − (1− δ)H1 (2.28)
Now let’s proceed to the second scenario, in which the health stock doesn’t enter
directly into the utility function. In this case, Eq 2.21 becomes
UC1 =
UC1
1 + r
θαHα−12 (2.29)
Thus the health stock in the future H2 only depends on interest rate
H2 =
1 + r
θα
1
α−1
(2.30)
In other words, as long as Eq 2.30 holds, under the assumption that the health capital
has no direct impact on the individual’s utility, to the individual, health investment and
saving become indifferent.
But we still have UC1 = β(1 + r)UC2 , thus we can write


C2 = β(1 + r)C1
H2 = (
1+r
θα
)
1
α−1
(2.31)
Substituting Eq 2.31 into the budget constraint and the law of motion of health,
finally we can obtain
C1 =
1
1 + β
[1− α
α
(
1 + r
θα
)
1
α−1 + θHα1 + (1− δ)H1
]
(2.32)
and
C2 =
β(1 + r)
1 + β
[1− α
α
(
1 + r
θα
)
1
α−1 + θHα1 + (1− δ)H1
]
(2.33)
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and
I1 = −(1− δ)H1 + (
1 + r
θα
)
1
α−1 (2.34)
Now let’s see what would change if there doesn’t exist a financial market. We assume
that the setting of the model is exactly the same under this assumption than the previous
one, except there is no interest rate. We shall use the same method to analyse the health
investment and consumption decision, the individual’s problem could be written as
maxU(C1, H1) + βU(C2, H2) (2.35)
subject to 

H2 = I1 + (1− δ)H1
C1 + I1 = θH
α
1
C2 = θH
α
2
If α = 0, the Lagrangian would be written as
L = U(C1, H1) + βU(C2, H2) + φH [H2 − I1 − (1− δ)H1]
+ φA,1(C1 + I1 − θ)
+ φA,2(C2 − θ)
Differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to C1, H2 and I1, we get
βUH2 = UC1 (2.36)
which would give us
H2 = β
1− µ
µ
C1 (2.37)
Substituting Eq 2.37 into the budget constraint and the law of motion of health,
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finally we can obtain
C1 =
µ
µ+ β − µβ
[θ + (1− δ)H1] (2.38)
and
C2 = θ (2.39)
and
I1 =
1− µ
µ
βC1 − (1− δ)H1 (2.40)
From Eq 2.38 and Eq 2.39, we can already sense the lack of consumption smoothing,
indeed, when the financial market is excluded and under the assumption that health stock
doesn’t impact income, the individual invests in health only to raise his UH , there is no
substitution between the 2 periods in terms of consumption since C2 is fixed no matter
the health stock in the second period.
When UH = 0, the Lagrangian of the individual’s problem would be written as
L = U(C1) + βU(C2) + φH [H2 − I1 − (1− δ)H1]
+ φA,1(C1 − I1 − θH
α−1
1 )
+ φA,2(C2 − θH
α
2 )
Differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to C1, C2, I1 and H2, we can obtain
UC1 = βθαH
α−1
2 UC2 (2.41)
which would give us
C2 = βθαH
α−1
2 C1 (2.42)
Eq 2.41 shows the substitution between C1 and C2 under the assumption that UH = 0.
Unlike the case when there is a financial market, here the substitution is taking place via
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the channel of health: health investment in the first period pushes up the health stock,
which in turn produces more income in the second period that would be completely
transferred into consumption.
Substituting Eq 2.42 into the budget constraint and the law of motion of health,
finally we can obtain
C1 =
θHα1 + (1− δ)H1
1 + βα
(2.43)
and
C2 = θH
α
2 = θβ
ααα
(θHα1 + (1− δ)H1
1 + βα
)α
(2.44)
and
I1 = βαC1 − (1− δ)H1 (2.45)
The above paragraphs conclude the consumption and health investment decisions
in each scenario, with or without the financial market. As we can see, when there is a
financial market, the Euler condition UC1 = β(1+ r)UC2 always holds, thus the individual
would always want to smooth his consumption as long as β tends to 1
1+r
, no matter how
he invests in health. On the contrary, when there is no financial market, this substitution
more or less disappears, under the pure consumption assumption, C1 and C2 are detached,
under the pure investment assumption, the substitution effect between C1 and C2 is still
there but it’s taking place via the channel of health capital.
To see more clearly the change, let us take the numeric approach. Let us assume that
θ = 1.4, α = 0.35, β = 0.96, µ = 0.9, δ = 0.7 and H1 = 0.6, we first set H1 = 0.6, and
we calculateC1, C2, I1 and S1 in each scenario, afterwards, in order of comparison, we set
H1 = 0.5 and we recalculate the values of each variable in each scenario. The values of
parameters are chosen such that the comparison of results could be more evident, other
than this there is no particular reason that we made this choice. Table 2.6 summarizes
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the value of each variable.
H1 = 0.6 C1 C2 I1 S1
With a financial Pure Investment 1.5988 1.9966 0.3308 0.0765
market Pure Consumption 2.1417 2.6728 0.0484 0.2099
Without a financial Pure Investment 1.637 1.9469 0.37 0
market Pure Consumption 2.3313 2.4 0.0687 0
H1 = 0.5 C1 C2 I1 S1
With a financial Pure Investment 1.5212 1.8984 0.3608 0.0011
market Pure Consumption 2.1272 2.6547 0.0769 0.1959
Without a financial Pure Investment 1.5217 1.8978 0.3613 0
market Pure Consumption 2.3042 2.4 0.0958 0
Table 2.6: Consumption and health investment decisions under each assumption, with or
without the financial market
We can see that with or without a financial market, the consumption smoothing
exists always, especially under the pure investment assumption, nevertheless, under the
pure consumption assumption, since C1 and C2 are completely detached, we see there is
nothing can be described as substitution between the 2 periods.
The key assumption that leads us to this result is that δ is assumed to be constant,
which means that the health capital would deteriorate at a constant rate. Given the
hypothesis that human body would not simply collapse in a single moment, it means that
at each period the individual is promised to receive a certain amount of money as income,
even it decreases with time, plus, the production function of health is assumed to be
CRS, thus the health investment would effectively help slow down the health depreciation
without a concern of its scale, consequently, this ‘permanent’ income flow that is promised
to the individual would be rather stable than volatile6, in other words, when health still
has impacts on the individual’s income and doesn’t just decrease way too fast, health
capital functions similarly as the financial market: it provides a channel that allows that
individual to substitute his consumptions between time periods, the individual could
6Of course the elasticity of income with respect to health α should also be relatively small, otherwise
we would have a rather volatile income flow.
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choose to consume less and invest in health in the present and receive an extra amount
of health in the future, this extra amount of health would help ease the depreciation and
thus help stabilize the health stock, which in turn would stabilize also the income flow,
as we can see, even with our a little extreme example, the consumption flow is not as
volatile as one would expect. In short, when there isn’t a financial market, the health
capital could play a similar role, thus the individual’s consumption choice wouldn’t be
affected too much, of course, when the financial market and the health capital exist in the
same time, the consumption flow would be even smoother, but as we can see, the absence
of the financial market doesn’t impact too much to the extent that it’s unacceptable.
Therefore it justifies Laporte’s choice of simplification, which is to exclude the finan-
cial market from his model, since he assumes a constant health depreciation rate and a
CRS production function of health, this simplification shouldn’t generate too much loss
on the analysis of human behaviours concerning health, on the contrary, in chapter 3,
though we use Laporte’s model as the basis of our model, we assume an increasing health
depreciation rate that depends on age, plus, in our model, the production function of
health is still CRS, hence as we shall see in the result section of chapter 3, our model
generates a decreasing income profile as well as a decreasing consumption profile, this is
indeed one of the flaws of our model and this is also why we conclude that the existence
of a financial market is necessary when health depreciation rate is increasing with age.
2.5 Optimal health investment choice strategy under
uncertainty
In this section, we shall continue using the simple example of our own, but this time,
a risk would be introduced, the risk would take 2 forms: first a risk of health, then a risk
of income.
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2.5.1 The risk of health
Let us assume that there is no change in the first period, but in the second period,
the depreciation rate of health stock could take 2 values: either δ with probability p or δ¯
with probability (1− p) and δ¯ > δ. Therefore the health stock in the second period could
also take 2 values: either H¯ or H with


H¯ = (1− δ)H1 + I1
H = (1− δ¯)H1 + I1
(2.46)
The individual’s problem Therefore the individual’s problem would be written as
maxU(C1, H1) + βE[U(C2, H2)] (2.47)
subject to 

θHα1 = C1 + I1 + S1
H¯2 = I1 + (1− δ)H1
θH¯α2 + (1 + r)S1 = C¯2
H2 = I1 + (1− δ¯)H1
θHα2 + (1 + r)S1 = C2
(2.48)
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The Lagrangian could be written as
L = U(C1, H1) + β[pU(C¯2, H¯2) + (1− p)U(C2, H2)]
+ φA,1(θH
α
1 − C1 − I1 − S1)
+ φA¯,2(θH¯
α
2 − C¯2 − (1 + r)S1)
+ φA,2(θH
α
2 − C2 − (1 + r)S1)
+ φH¯(H¯2 − I1 − (1− δ)H1)
+ φH(H2 − I1 − (1− δ¯)H1)
(2.49)
Differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to C1, S1, I1, C¯2, C2, H¯2 and H2, we obtain
∂L
∂C1
= UC1 − φA,1 = 0
∂L
∂S1
= −φA,1 + (1 + r)(φA¯,2 + φA,2) = 0
∂L
∂I1
= −φA,1 − φH¯ − φH = 0
∂L
∂C¯2
= βp(UC¯2)− φA¯,2 = 0
∂L
∂C2
= β(1− p)(UC2)− φA,2 = 0
∂L
∂H¯2
= βp(UH¯2) + φA¯,2θαH¯
α−1
2 + φH¯ = 0
∂L
∂H2
= β(1− p)(UH2) + φA,2θαH
α−1
2 + φH = 0
Combing these first order conditions, we can write


UC1 = βE(UH2) + φA¯,2θαH¯
α−1
2 + φA,2θαH
α−1
2
UC1 = β(1 + r)E(UC2)
(2.50)
Eq 2.50 shows that when an uncertainty is introduced, a precautionary action will
take place. In a standard stochastic model, this action would function via the channel
of the financial market, hence the famous “precautionary saving”. In our example, since
one’s health stock also affects one’s future income, thus the precautionary action would
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function via 2 channels: either by precautionary savings or by health investment, the
second equation of Eq 2.50 shows how the individual would smooth his consumptions
between periods via the precautionary savings, which is pretty standard, the first equation
of Eq 2.50 shows that how the individual could smooth his consumption by investing in
health: the more the individual invests in health, the more income it would produce in the
second period7(φA¯,2θαH¯
α−1
2 + φA,2θαH
α−1
2 ), thus the more he would be able to consume,
plus, the higher the individual’s health stock, also the higher his utilities(E(UH2)). The
individual has to choose between the 2 channels in order to maximize his utilities.
Let us continue using the same form of the utility function as in the previous section,
plus, let us also assume that E(δ) = pδ+(1−p)δ¯ = δd, where δd indicates the depreciation
rate of health in the deterministic environment.
Since we have 12 unknown variables: φA,1, φA¯,2, φA,2, φH¯ , φH , C1, S1, I1, C¯2, C2, H¯2
7Of course it also depends on the elasticity of income with respect to health, α.
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and H2 and also 12 equations:


θHα1 = C1 + I1 + S1
H¯2 = I1 + (1− δ)H1
θH¯α2 + (1 + r)S1 = C¯2
H2 = I1 + (1− δ¯)H1
θHα2 + (1 + r)S1 = C2
µ
C1
− φA,1 = 0
−φA,1 + (1 + r)(φA¯,2 + φA,2) = 0
−φA,1 − φH¯ − φH = 0
βp( µ
C¯2
)− φA¯,2 = 0
β(1− p)( µ
C2
)− φA,2 = 0
βp(1−µ
H¯2
) + φA¯,2θαH¯
α−1
2 + φH¯ = 0
β(1− p)(1−µ
H2
) + φA,2θαH
α−1
2 + φH = 0
(2.51)
thus it should be sufficient to find the solution to the problem, using a standard Newton
algorithm.
In the previous section, we divided our example into 2 branches: either health status
doesn’t affect the individual’s income, either health doesn’t enter the individual’s utility
function. Let us begin with the former branch, in our example, it would mean that α = 0,
under this condition, Eq 2.50 becomes


UC1 = βE(UH2)
UC1 = β(1 + r)UC2
(2.52)
Note that when α = 0, the individual would receive the same amount of income in
both periods(θ), no matter his health status, thus the expected value symbol is excluded
in the second equation of Eq 2.52, this also means that there will be no precautionary
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savings because of the uncontrollable income fluctuation.
Take the Taylor expansion of RHS of the first equation of Eq 2.52 around E(H2), we
can write
βE((1− µ)H−12 ) = β
{
E[(1− µ)(E(H2))
−1]− (1− µ)[(E(H2))
−2]E[H2 − E(H2)]
+(1− µ)[(E(H2))
−3]E[H2 − E(H2)]
2 + o(σ2)
}
(2.53)
where o(σ2) represents high order moments.
Since the term E[H2 − E(H2)] = 0, and let us omit the term o(σ2), then Eq 2.53
would become
βE((1− µ)H−12 ) ≈ β
{
(1− µ)(E(H2))
−1 + (1− µ)[(E(H2))
−3]E[H2 − E(H2)]
2
}
(2.54)
By definition, E(H2) denotes the expected value of health stock in the second pe-
riod, however, it could also indicate, under certainty and with the same amount of health
investment as in the stochastic environment, the amount of health capital that the indi-
vidual could possess, if this is the case, then such amount of health E(H2) would also be
matched by a set of consumption choice, let us call it {EC1, EC2}.
Now take the Taylor expansion of the LHS of the first equation of Eq 2.52 around
EC1, we can write
UC1 ≈ UEC1 + UEC1EC1(C1 − EC1) (2.55)
Substituting Eq 2.55 and Eq 2.54 into the first equation of Eq 2.52 and rearrange,
one can easily obtain
C1 − EC1 =
β
UEC1EC1
× (1− µ)[(E(H2))
−3]E[H2 − E(H2)]
2 (2.56)
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Since UEC1EC1 is obviously less than 0, hence the RHS of Eq 2.56 would also be less
than 0, meaning that C1 < EC1. That’s to say, because of the introduction of a health
risk, the individual would choose to consume less in the first period, plus, as what we
have mentioned, in this scenario there would be no precautionary saving because of income
fluctuations, thus this supplement amount of resources that the individual possesses would
be completely invested into health. In addition, Eq 2.56 states that the difference between
C1 and EC1 depends on the importance of the variance of health, which is directly affected
by the variance of δ, thus we can deduce that the larger the variance of δ, the smaller C1.
The problem can only be solved numerically, since the investment aspect of health is
excluded, the system 2.51 can be reduced to


θ = C1 + I1 + S1
H¯2 = I1 + (1− δ)H1
θ + (1 + r)S1 = C2
H2 = I1 + (1− δ¯)H1
µ
C1
− φA,1 = 0
−φA,1 + (1 + r)φA,2 = 0
−φA,1 − φH¯ − φH = 0
βp( µ
C2
)− φA,2 = 0
βp(1−µ
H¯2
) + φH¯ = 0
β(1− p)(1−µ
H2
) + φH = 0
(2.57)
Rearrange the system 2.57, we can reduce it to


(1 + β)C1 + I1 −
θ
1+r
− θ = 0
µ
1−µ
[ p
(1−δ)H1+I1
+ 1−p
(1−δ¯)H1+I1
]− βC1 = 0
(2.58)
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The system 2.58 is composed of 2 unknown variables(C1 and I1) and 2 equations, it
should fairly easy enough to compile the programme, using the standard Newton algo-
rithm. For the purpose of comparison, we shall take the same parameter values as in the
last section as benchmark calibrations. As for the value of δ¯, δ and p, we choose δ¯ = 0.8,
δ = 0.6 and p = 0.5, once again there is no particular reason that we make this choice,
these values are chosen only to make sure that the expected value of δ would be equal to
its deterministic counterpart. The results can be seen in Table 2.7
C1 I1 S1
Under certainty, benchmark 2.1417 0.0484 0.2099
Under certainty, with same I1 as under uncertainty 2.2734 0.0625 0.218
Uncertainty, δ¯ = 0.6, δ = 0.8 2.1345 0.0625 0.203
Uncertainty, δ¯ = 0.5, δ = 0.9 2.1166 0.0976 0.1858
Table 2.7: Consumption and health investment decisions under the pure consumption
assumption, with the financial market
Table 2.7 shows that when the uncertainty is introduced and under the pure con-
sumption assumption, the individual will indeed choose to reduce his consumption in
the first period, in order to invest more in health rather than saving, since in this situa-
tion the individual’s income is not affected, note that if we are to have the same health
investment under certainty than under uncertainty, θ needs to be higher than in the
benchmark calibration, which means that the individual’s health investment choice under
uncertainty actually matches the individual’s health investment choice under certainty
but with a higher health production efficiency, showing the effect of the uncertainty. In
addition, as we can see, the more dispersion between the “good” situation(δ) and the
“bad” situation(δ¯), the more health investment, and the less the C1 as well as S1, this
result corresponds to our assumption and is actually logic: the riskier the uncertainty,
the more incentive the individual would have to ensure themselves against it, and under
the pure consumption branch, the only channel that remains is the health investment
channel.
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Now let’s take a look at the other branch, in which health stock is excluded from the
utility function, therefore Eq 2.50 would become


UC1 = +φA¯,2θαH¯
α−1
2 + φA,2θαH
α−1
2
UC1 = β(1 + r)E(UC2)
(2.59)
In this scenario, the arbitrage that the individual has to make becomes more apparent:
since health doesn’t affect one’s utility any more, the sole reason to invest in health is
to compensate the uncontrollable loss of health via this investment, and thus ensure a
more predictable income flow, or, the individual can achieve this goal via savings, the 2
channels of our example functions now to the same end. Thus we can deduce that in
this scenario, the individual’s consumption choice won’t be affected too much with the
introduction of the uncertainty, and the arbitrage of the choice between health investment
and saving should depends on the attraction of these 2 channels(α and r).
Unfortunately, it’s not likely that we can give out some analysis of this branch using
the same fashion as what we did for the previous branch, thus numerically, we can only
compare the results under uncertainty with those under certainty and not with their
certainty equivalents.
The problem can also be solved numerically using the same method as for the pure
consumption branch, since health is excluded from the utility function, the system 2.51
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can be rewritten as 

θHα1 = C1 + I1 + S1
H¯2 = I1 + (1− δ)H1
θH¯α2 + (1 + r)S1 = C¯2
H2 = I1 + (1− δ¯)H1
θHα2 + (1 + r)S1 = C2
µ
C1
− φA,1 = 0
−φA,1 + (1 + r)(φA¯,2 + φA,2) = 0
−φA,1 − φH¯ − φH = 0
βp( µ
C¯2
)− φA¯,2 = 0
β(1− p)( µ
C2
)− φA,2 = 0
φA¯,2θαH¯
α−1
2 + φH¯ = 0
φA,2θαH
α−1
2 + φH = 0
(2.60)
Rearrange the system 2.60, it can be reduced to


θHα1 − C1 − I1 − S1 = 0
1
C1
− β(1 + r)[ 1
C¯2
+ 1−p
C2
] = 0
1
C1
− βp
C¯2
θαH¯α−12 −
β(1−p)
C2
θαHα−12 = 0
(2.61)
where H¯2 = I1 + (1 − δ)H1, H2 = I1 + (1 − δ¯)H1, C¯2 = θH¯
α
2 + (1 + r)S1 and C2 =
θHα2 + (1 + r)S1.
The system 2.61 is composed of 3 equations and 3 unknown variables(C1, I1 and S1),
thus the same method can be applied to solve the problem. We shall always use the same
parameter values and we first calculate the values of unknown variables with α = 0.35,
then we raise it to 0.38 and decrease it to 0.25 and recalculate the values of these variables
in each scenario. As for the interest rate r, we do the same thing: we first calculate the
values of unknown variables with r = 0.3, then we raise it to 0.4 and decrease it to 0.25
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and recalculate the values of these variables in each scenario.
The results are shown in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9.
C1 I1 S1
Under certainty, benchmark 1.5988 0.3308 0.0765
Under certainty, α = 0.25 1.7155 0.1767 0.2201
Uncertainty, α = 0.25 1.7125 0.1874 0.2124
Uncertainty, α = 0.35 1.5975 0.3388 0.0708
Uncertainty, α = 0.38 1.5680 0.392 0.0165
Table 2.8: Consumption and health investment decisions under the pure investment as-
sumption with change of α, with the financial market
C1 I1 S1
Under certainty, benchmark 1.5988 0.3308 0.0765
Under certainty, r = 0.25 1.6299 0.3625 0.0147
Uncertainty, r = 0.25 1.6276 0.3702 0.0092
Uncertainty, r = 0.3 1.5975 0.3388 0.0708
Uncertainty, r = 0.4 1.5451 0.2845 0.1775
Table 2.9: Consumption and health investment decisions under the pure investment as-
sumption with change of r, with the financial market
Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 show that when the uncertainty is introduced, the individual
will choose to either save more or invest more in health. The arbitrage actually depends on
the importance of the income elasticity α and the interest rate r: if α is not large enough,
then health investment would not produce enough resources in the second period, thus
the individual will choose to save more, on the contrary, if α is large enough that sufficient
income could be produced via the channel of health, then the individual would choose
to invest more in health, even it means to cut part of his consumption. The same trend
could be observed when r changes: the higher the interest rate, the more important the
savings and the less important the health investment, on the contrary, when r is low, the
individual would choose to invest more in health and save less.
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2.5.2 The risk of income
Now let us examine what would happen when the uncertainty is brought upon income
and not on health. By this assumption, δ would return constant and α should be equal to
0, plus, for there is a risk of income, we assume that in the second period, the individual’s
income θ2 would take 2 values: either θ¯ with probability p or θ with probability (1−p), we
also assumes that E(θ2) = θ, in the meantime, we continue assuming that the individual’s
income in the first period remains unchanged with θ1 = θ.
The individual’s problem Therefore the individual’s problem would be written as
maxU(C1, H1) + β[pU(C¯2, H2) + (1− p)U(C2, H2)] (2.62)
subject to 

θ1 = C1 + I1 + S1
H2 = (1− δ)H1 + I1
θ¯ + (1 + r)S1 = C¯2
θ + (1 + r)S1 = C2
(2.63)
The Lagrangian could be written as
L = U(C1, H1) + β[pU(C¯2, H2) + (1− p)U(C2, H2)]
+ φA,1(θ − C1 − I1 − S1)
+ φA¯,2(θ¯ − C¯2 + (1 + r)S1)
+ φA,2(θ − C2 + (1 + r)S1)
+ φH(H2 − I1 − (1− δ)H1)
(2.64)
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Differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to C1, S1, I1, C¯2, C2 and H2, we obtain
∂L
∂C1
= UC1 − φA,1 = 0
∂L
∂S1
= −φA,1 + (1 + r)(φA¯,2 + φA,2) = 0
∂L
∂I1
= −φA,1 − φH = 0
∂L
∂C¯2
= βp(UC¯2)− φA¯,2 = 0
∂L
∂C2
= β(1− p)(UC2)− φA,2 = 0
∂L
∂H2
= βUH2 + φH = 0
By these first order conditions we could obtain


UC1 = βUH2
UC1 = β(1 + r)E(UC2)
(2.65)
System 2.65 states the classic intertemporal substitution between periods, as what the
first equation of the system shows, since here the uncertainty is only on the income, then
there should be no precautionary actions in terms of health investment, in the meantime,
the individual should prepare some precautionary savings against the odds of income.
The situation is completely contrary to the pure consumption branch we have men-
tioned in the previous subsection when the risk of health is introduced, but they all follow
the same logic: to see this, take the Tylor expansion of the RHS of the second equation of
system 2.65 around EC2, where EC2 denotes the certainty equivalent of C2, the equation
could be written as
β(1 + r)E(UC2) = β(1 + r){UEC2 +
1
2
UEC2EC2EC2E[C2 − EC2]
2} (2.66)
Since we have defined EC2, we could also define EC1 as its counterpart of the first
period in the deterministic environment, now take the Tylor expansion of the LHS of the
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second equation of system 2.65 around EC1, we can write
UC1 = UEC1 + UEC1EC1(C1 − EC1) (2.67)
Substituting Eq 2.66 and Eq 2.67 into the second equation of the system 2.65, we
can find
C1 − EC1 =
1
2
UEC2EC2EC2
UEC1EC1
E[C2 − EC2]
2 (2.68)
Since UEC2EC2EC2 is greater than 0 and UEC1EC1 is less than 0, then we have C1 <
EC1, showing that when the individual’s income becomes unpredictable, the individual
would reduce his consumption in order to save more, thus the famous “precautionary
savings”. In addition, the difference between C1 and EC1 depends on the variance of C2,
which, in our example, is directly affected by the variance of θ2.
The problem can also be solved numerically, using the very same Newton algorithm:
with the same form of utility function, the problem could be reduced to


1
C1
− β(1 + r)[ p
θ¯+(1+r)S1
+ 1−p
θ+(1+r)S1
] = 0
1−µ
µ
βC1 − C1 + θ + (1− δ)H1 − S1 = 0
(2.69)
There are 2 unknown variables(C1 and S1) and 2 equations, thus it’s sufficient to find
a solution. The results are shown in the Table 2.10.
C1 I1 S1
Under certainty, benchmark 2.1417 0.0484 0.2099
Under certainty, with same S1 as under uncertainty 2.1493 0.0493 0.2103
Uncertainty, θ¯ = 2.45, θ = 2.35 2.1413 0.0484 0.2103
Uncertainty, θ¯ = 2.5, θ = 2.3 2.1403 0.0483 0.2114
Table 2.10: Consumption and health investment decisions with change of θ2
From Table 2.10 we can see that under uncertainty of income, the individual would
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choose to consume less and save more, plus, as θ2 becomes more and more disperse, the
individual would choose to consume even less in the first period, in order to save even
more rather than investing more in health, for the only uncertainty in this situation is the
odds of income. Besides, if we are to have the same amount of savings under certainty
than under uncertainty, it also requires a higher θ, which is the same thing as what we
have seen in the pure consumption assumption when there is a risk of health.
The above fictive example shows one simple way to introduce the risk, though its
simplicity and its naivety, the example provides a first impression of how the uncertainty
would alter the individual’s decisions. In chapter 4, we shall take this stochastic approach
and build a structural model upon the aiyagari’s model, in which a risk of health is added,
as well as a risk of income8.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we answer the 2 questions proposed at the beginning of the thesis
by reviewing existing literatures, the review of literatures is undertaken by 2 approaches:
both the deterministic approach and the stochastic approach, in the deterministic ap-
proach we show that the Grossman health capital model turns to be still very handful in
terms of estimating individual life-cycle profiles when there are fluctuations of health, but
criticisms argue that the lack of uncertain nature of health makes the Grossman health
capital model unreliable, nevertheless, as what we have shown in the second approach,
the stochastic approach, this problem can be eventually ‘fixed’ by introducing a stochas-
tic process into the model and we also show that how the uncertainty would alter the
individual’s decisions.
In latter chapters, we will continue following this path and show our contributions to
8But it doesn’t depend on the agent’s health status
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each approach. In addition, we also seek to answer the following 2 more precise questions
by the following chapters:
• We argue that the human capital model leaves window for immortality, so is it
possible to close this window by adding an finite time horizon? That is, a lifetime
health decision model within a reasonable life length.
• Characterizing shocks(for example, earning shocks or health shocks) by a Markov
chain, we can construct models that replicate the structure of a certain economy, but
is it possible to have a unified framework that can be applied to multiple countries
? If yes, can then we use this model to not only identify the differences across
countries in terms of health, but also explore the key elements of public policies
that can help improve the situation ?
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Chapter 3
A Life-Cycle Model with health
spending and endogenous lifetime
3.1 Introduction
Health spending holds a growing place in economic debate. At the macroeconomic
level, health spending represents a growing share of the GDP. At the microeconomic level,
health spending is a key variable in agent choices over the life-cycle. Moreover, it tends
to represent a growing share in agents’ spending over his life cycle. The issue of health
spending and its growing trend may stem from several factors: ageing, scientific innova-
tions or new medical treatments, etc.. Ageing leads to an increase in demand and scientific
innovations lead to an increase in supply (new treatments, quality improvement,...).
In this article, we are interested in studying health spending decisions over the life-
cycle. What are the main features of health spending over the life-cycle? French, Mc-
Cauley, Aragon et al. (2017)[20] provide a lot of data concerning end-of-life medical
spending in a large set of countries. They focuse particularly on the last 3 years (and
the last year) of life. In most countries, medical spending made at the last year of life
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represents 8 to 11% of the aggregate medical spending (8.5% in the US). Concerning the
last 3 years of life, the medical spending made during this period represents between 16.7
and 24.5% of the aggregate medical spending made over the life-cycle(16.7% in the US).
Even if we consider the heterogeneity between countries, it is clear that medical spending
in the last 3 years of life represents a significant share of the aggregate medical spending.
Using US data, Halliday, He, Ning, and Zhang (2017)[27] and Fonseca et al. (2008)[18]
report an increasing profile of medical spending over the life-cycle, medical spending be-
ing approximatively zero around 20-25 years old. Jung and Tran (2013)[31] reach similar
conclusions. They also estimate the evolution of the share of health spending. At 20-25
years old, health spending is zero while at 85, it roughly represents more than 50% of
income. The profile is increasing and convex. Finally, we underline that at the aggregate
level, medical spending represent around 17% of the GDP in the US.
From a theoretical point of view, Grossman (1972)[23] develops a framework including
a modeling of health spending. Grossman[23]’s model is a life-cycle one and he considers
the health level may be represented by a stock variable, that is the health stock or health
capital. The health stock has a positive impact on the agent’s welfare. It depreciates at a
rate possibly increasing with age. The health stock can also be improved or maintained by
continuously health investment. Finally, the income of the agent is an increasing function
of his health. If the health stock becomes less than a threshold, the agent dies, lifespan
is an endogenous variable. The health capital concept is in the continuity of the human
capital concept introduced among others by Ben-Porath (1967)[5]. The agent has also
access to a financial market on which a risk-free asset is exchanged. Grossman[23]’s model
includes several other features we will not detail.
Grossman[23]’s model is at the base of a vast literature. Halliday, He, Ning, and
Zhang (2017)[27] and Fonseca et al. (2008)[18] use life-cycle models including an health
stock variable, an endogenous health spending and a financial asset. They evaluate the
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ability of their models to quantitatively replicate some stylized facts. Fonseca et al.
(2008)[18] are interested by retirement choices in an uncertain environment. They sim-
ulate the path of some key variables and discuss their adequacy with their empirical
counterpart. Halliday, He, Ning, and Zhang (2017)[27] focus on the growing profile of
health spending over the life-cycle. Their model, with endogenous labour supply, is cal-
ibrated, numerically solved and simulated. They discuss the ability of their model to
replicate the profile of some variables such as consumption or medical spending.
Some authors theoretically study the Grossman[23]’s model. In order to obtain an-
alytical results and to isolate the key mechanism, they use a simplified version (often in
continuous time) with only a health stock variable and without a financial asset. La-
porte (2015)[34] derives some results concerning the dynamic of the model (uses of phases
diagrams). Strulik (2015)[47] obtains a closed-form solution and performs exercices of
comparative dynamics. Finally, Laporte and Ferguson (2017)[35] introduce uncertainty
into the model.
In the contributions of Laporte (2015)[34], Laporte and Ferguson (2017)[35] and
Strulik (2015)[47], the depreciation rate of health stock is constant over time, which allows
the agent to potentially live forever. Indeed, in the Grossman’s model, the agent stays
alive as long as the health stock is above the threshold. If the health stock depreciation
rate is constant, the agent may have the possibility to indefinitely maintain its health stock
above the threshold. In this article, we consider a more realistic assumption and suppose
that the health stock depreciation rate increases as the agent ages. Lifespan is now an
endogenous variable. In order to avoid utility being negative, we use an utility fonction
with a strong and positive enough constant, which is in line with that of Rosen (1988)[42]
and Hall and Jones (2007)[26]. This model, written in discrete time, is solved numerically.
A realistic calibration with a life span of 85 years shows that our model is able to replicate
a growing path of the health spending over the life-cycle and a significant share of health
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spending especially at the end of life. We also perform a sensitivity analysis, which allows
us to evaluate how the numerical results are modified if the value of some key parameters
are changed.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model and derive the
optimality conditions, in section 3, we discuss the calibration strategy and the numerical
results.
3.2 A life-cycle model with health capital
3.2.1 Presentation of the model
Our model is based on Grossman (1972)[23]. We use a simplified version similar to
the one developed by Strulik (2015)[47], Laporte (2015)[34] and Laporte and Ferguson
(2017)[35] while keeping the main ingredients of Grossman’s model. Agent’s health is
characterized by its health capital level and agent’s utility depends on consumption and
health. The income of the agent is an increasing function of the health capital. The agent
must allocate its income between consumption and investment in health capital. Finally,
we assume that health capital depreciates at a rate increasing with age. The agent ceases
to live if the health capital fall below a threshold.
The intertemporal utility function The representative agent maximizes its intertem-
poral discounted utility:
T∑
t=0
βt
(
(Cγt H
1−γ
t )
1−σ
1− σ
+ b
)
(3.1)
with Ct the consumption and Ht the health capital. T is the agent lifespan which is an
endogenous variable. More precisely, we consider t = 0 corresponds to the beginning of
the active life (that is 25 years) and T is the lifespan in adulthood (that is T+25 years).
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β ∈]0, 1[ is the discount factor, σ > 1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and
γ ∈]0, 1[ is the weight of consumption in utility. It is also possible to interpret Cγt H
1−γ
t
as an aggregate good produced with private consumption and health capital through a
constant return to scales technology.
b is a constant positive term. The key role of this parameter is widely discussed by
Rosen (1988)[42] and Hall and Jones (2007)[26]. In particular, the value of b must be
sufficiently high to ensure a positive flow of utility. We’ll discuss this point in Section
3.2.2.
The law of motion of health capital Health capital evolution is described by the
following equation:
Ht = (1− δt)Ht−1 + AIt (3.2)
It represents the investment in health capital. Health capital is produced through a linear
technology, A being the efficiency of this technology. Thus, at each date, the health
capital is increased by an amount AIt.
Health capital depreciates at a rate δt increasing with the age of the agent. Following
Fonseca et al. (2008)[18], we guess that δt could be written as follows:
δt = δ1 exp(δ2t)
with δ1 > 0 and δ2 > 0. δ1 represents the health depreciation at the beginning of the
adulthood.
Death occurs when health capital falls below the threshold H > 0. The agent is still
alive at period t if Ht ≥ H.
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The aggregate resource constraint There is a unique good produced by the house-
hold which is consumed and invested. The good is produced by the household through
a decreasing return to scales technology. Health capital Ht is the unique input. The
household’s production can also be interpreted as an income in real terms. The agent can
improve its health by reducing consumption and increasing investment in health capital.
At each period t, one has:
θHαt − It − Ct = 0 (3.3)
where θ > 0 denotes the efficiency of the production technology. Having assuming a
decreasing return to scales technology, one has α ∈]0, 1[.
Finally, we impose the following positivity condition on investment, It ≥ 0, ∀t =
0, 1, ..., T . This condition is natural since health capital can not be “uninstalled” and
sold.
Household’s programme The initial health capital of the agent is Ht−1 > H. The
agent chooses the optimal path of consumption and investment maximizing his lifetime
utility subjected to resource constraints. First, let us assume a given lifespan T . The
household’s program is therefore written as:
max
T∑
t=0
βt
(
(Cγt H
1−γ
t )
1−σ
1− σ
+ b
)
(3.4)
subject to 

−Ht + (1− δt)Ht−1 + AIt = 0 (qt)
θHαt − Ct − It = 0 (µt)
It ≥ 0 (ηt)
Ht −H ≥ 0 (ξt)
(3.5)
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The optimality conditions The Lagrangian associated to the above program is writ-
ten as:
L =
T∑
t=0
βt
(
(Cγt H
1−γ
t )
1−σ
1− σ
+ b
)
+
T∑
t=0
βtqt(−Ht + (1− δt)Ht−1 + AIt)
+
T∑
t=0
βtµt(θH
α
t − It − Ct) +
T∑
t=0
βtηtIt +
T∑
t=0
βtξt(Ht −H)
=
T∑
t=0
βt
(
(Cγt H
1−γ
t )
1−σ
1− σ
+ b
)
+
T∑
t=0
βtqt(−Ht + AIt) +
T−1∑
t=−1
βt+1qt+1(1− δt+1)Ht
+
T∑
t=0
βtµt(θH
α
t − It − Ct) +
T∑
t=0
βtηtIt +
T∑
t=0
βtξt(Ht −H)
The following optimality conditions are obtained:
∂L
∂Ct
= βtγ
(Cγt H
1−γ
t )
1−σ
Ct
− βtµt = 0, t = 0, . . . , T
∂L
∂It
= βtqtA− β
tµt + β
tηt = 0, t = 0, . . . , T
∂L
∂Ht
= βt
[
(1− γ)
(Cγt H
1−γ
t )
1−σ
Ht
+ µtθαH
α−1
t + ξt − qt
]
+ βt+1qt+1(1− δt+1) = 0,
t = 0, . . . , T − 1
∂L
∂HT
= βT
[
(1− γ)
(CγTH
1−γ
T )
1−σ
HT
+ µT θαH
α−1
T + ξT − qT
]
= 0
t = T
Otherwise, one has the following exclusion conditions:
ηtIt = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , T, with ηt ≥ 0
ξt(Ht −H) = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, with ξt ≥ 0
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The system of equations that characterizes the solution The initial health capital
H−1 is supposed to be given. The unknown variables are:
Ct, t = 0, . . . , T
Ht, t = 0, . . . , T
It, t = 0, . . . , T
qt, t = 0, . . . , T
µt, t = 0, . . . , T
ηt, t = 0, . . . , T
ξt, t = 0, . . . , T
The system to be solved is defined by the following set of equations:
γ
(Cγt H
1−γ
t )
1−σ
Ct
− µt = 0, t = 0, . . . , T
qtA− µt + ηt = 0, t = 0, . . . , T
(1− γ)
(Cγt H
1−γ
t )
1−σ
Ht
+ µtθαH
α−1
t + ξt − qt + βqt+1(1− δt+1) = 0, t = 0, . . . , T − 1
(1− γ)
(CγTH
1−γ
T )
1−σ
HT
+ µT θαH
α−1
T + ξT − qT = 0,
ηtIt = 0, t = 0, . . . , T with ηt ≥ 0
ξt(Ht −H) = 0, t = 0, . . . , T with ξt ≥ 0
−Ht + (1− δt)Ht−1 + AIt = 0, t = 0, . . . , T
θHαt − It − Ct = 0, t = 0, . . . , T
There are (T + 1)× 7 equations and (T + 1)× 7 unknown variables. The system of
equations is thus “well-posed” and we can undertake to solve it numerically.
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Guess about the characterizations of the solution As previously mentioned, the
system of equations can not be solved analytically. The system is solved numerically using
a standard Newton algorithm. The problem includes two positivity constraints and we
have to determine when these constraints are binding or not. This is done numerically.
If the path followed by the variables can only be determined numerically, it is however
possible to provide some intuitions about the optimal path of the variables. The optimal
solution may reasonably take two forms (T being taken as given):
1. Let suppose that Ht > H, ∀t = 0, ..., T . If the health capital is strictly greater than
H at the last period of life, investment may be equal to zero during the last periods.
To sum up:
It > 0 and ηt = 0, ∀t = 0, . . . , T − 1
It = 0 and ηt ≥ 0, ∀t = T , . . . , T
Ht ≥ H and ξt = 0, ∀t = 0, . . . , T
This case may occurs if the initial health capital H−1 is sufficiently high or the
health capital production sufficiently efficient.
2. Let suppose that Ht > H, ∀t = 0, ..., T − 1 and HT = H.
It > 0 and ηt = 0, ∀t = 0, . . . , T
Ht > H and ξt = 0, ∀t = 0, . . . , T − 1
HT = H and ξT ≥ 0
In this case, we guess the investment constraint is never bound. Indeed, investment
will necessarily be strictly positive during the last periods of life to ensure that
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health capital is not below the threshold H. Intuitively, this case may occur if the
initial health capital is low.
Optimal lifetime We previously considered that the lifetime T was given. In our
setting, T must be chosen in such a way it maximizes the agent’s intertemporal utility.
The optimal value of T may be determined in a simple way. For all the possible values
of T , solve (numerically) the above problem and compute the value of the intertemporal
utility, that is:
T∑
t=0
βt
(
(Cγt H
1−γ
t )
1−σ
1− σ
+ b
)
Finally, choose the value T ∗ that maximizes the intertemporal utility.
But is there a more sophisticated method to determine the optimal value T ∗? In a
continuous time framework, the question is well documented and optimality conditions
can easily be found to determine an optimal lifespan. Yet, in a discrete time framework,
to our knowledge, there is a lack of references and the derivation and the writing of the
optimality conditions is not immediate1.
Here we propose an optimality condition obtained through an adaptation of the
continuous time case.
We define the following Hamiltonian:
H(T ) =
(
(CγTH
1−γ
T )
1−σ
1− σ
+ b
)
+ qT (−δTHT−1 + IT )
In continuous time, the optimal time satisfies2 H(T ∗) = 0. This condition has to be
adapted if time is discrete because problems of “indivisibility” occurs.
1In a continuous time problem, the optimality condition giving the optimal time is obtained by deriving
the intertemporal utility with respect to T and applying the envelop theorem.
2This condition can be found in any standard optimal control book.
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Now, assume that for T = T+, one has:
H(T+) =
(
(Cγ
T+
H1−γ
T+
)1−σ
1− σ
+ b
)
+ qT+(−δT+HT+−1 + IT+) > 0
H(T+ + 1) =
(
(Cγ
T++1H
1−γ
T++1)
1−σ
1− σ
+ b
)
+ qT++1(−δT++1HT+ + IT++1) < 0
We can conclude that:
T ∗ = T+ if |H(T+)| < |H(T+ + 1)|
T ∗ = T+ + 1 if |H(T+)| > |H(T+ + 1)|
We previously discussed the characteristics of the optimal path for a given value of
T . What can be said about the optimal path of health capital if the life time is also
optimal (T ∗)? The agent is alive as long as Ht ≥ H. If at date T , one has HT > H and
(1− δT )HT ≥ H, the agent can live one more period without investing in health capital.
Clearly, T is thus not an optimal life time. We conclude at the optimal time T ∗, one has
HT ∗ = H.
The above optimality condition is not necessary to solve numerically the problem.
However, it is useful to provide some economic interpretations concerning the determi-
nants of the optimal lifetime.
3.2.2 The constant term in the utility function
Here we discuss the meaning of the term b in the utility function. Rosen (1988)[42]
is interested by the question of the value of life and develops theoretical frameworks
allowing to highlight its determinants. Two classes of models are considered, models
with a survival rate and deterministic life-cycle models. Note that this two classes of
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models are closely related and have very similar results. In the line of Rosen (1988)[42],
we use a deterministic life-cycle model in which the lifetime is endogenously determined.
In models like ours, the constant term b of the utility fonction plays an important and
“non-standard” role because it has implications on the decisions of the agents. This point
is discussed in detail by Rosen (1988)[42] and Hall and Jones (2007)[26]. In standard
microeconomic theory, it is always possible to consider an increasing transformation of a
utility fonction. This transformation does not impact the marginal utility ratios and thus
the optimal decisions. Our model works very differently than standard ones. Indeed, in
our framework, as in Rosen[42]’s, the choice problem is a very particular one. The agent
has to determine the optimal consumption and health investment plans. These decisions
only depend on the marginal utility and the constant b does not impact the optimality
conditions. Our model is also a life-cycle one and the agent has to determine his optimal
lifetime T ∗. The associated optimality condition (see subsection 3.2.1) significantly differs
from the other optimality conditions and the level of utility now matters. It is thus easy
to understand that the value of b will significantly alter agent decisions (through the value
of the optimal lifetime). Furthermore, the optimization problem determining the optimal
lifetime has a solution if b is positive and sufficiently large.
The life-cycle utility We follow Rosen (1988)[42] who explains how this utility function
may be set and how the constant b may be understood.
The lifetime is T . The instantaneous utility of the agent (during his lifetime) is:
u(Ct, Ht) =
(Cγt H
1−γ
t )
1−σ
1− σ
The agent utility over its life-cycle is given by:
T∑
t=0
βtu(Ct, Ht)
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However, the above expression does not provide a complete evaluation of the agent utility
over his life-cycle. Indeed, we suppose that the agent incurs a disutility of being death,
the instantaneous disutility being −b. Evaluated at t = 0, the disutility of being death at
t > T is given by βt(−b). To sum up, the life-cycle utility of the agent is written as:
T∑
t=0
βtu(Ct, Ht) +
∞∑
t=T+1
βt(−b)
Rearranging the above expression, one gets:
T∑
t=0
βtu(Ct, Ht) +
∞∑
t=T+1
βt(−b) =
T∑
t=0
βt (u(Ct, Ht) + b)−
b
1− β
The term b
1−β
being independent of T may be dropped. We thus obtain the intertemporal
utility fonction of subsection 3.2.1, that is:
T∑
t=0
βt (u(Ct, Ht) + b)
Optimal longevity The optimality condition giving the optimal lifetime T ∗ is given in
Subsection 3.2.1. To simplify the analysis, assume that T ∗ is such that one exactly has
H(T ∗) = 0. Note that it is the standard optimality condition obtained in the continuous
time equivalent model. At subsection 3.2.1, we just use the discrete time counterpart.
H(T ∗) =
(CγT ∗H
1−γ
T ∗ )
1−σ
1− σ
+ b+ qT ∗(−δT ∗HT ∗−1 + IT ∗) = 0
Evaluated at t = 0, the above condition can be rewritten as follows:
βT
∗
H(T ∗) = βT
∗
[u(CT ∗ , HT ∗) + b] + β
T ∗qT ∗(−δT ∗HT ∗−1 + IT ∗) = 0
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or
βT
∗
H(T ∗) = βT
∗
[u(CT ∗ , HT ∗) + b] + β
T ∗qT ∗(HT ∗ −HT ∗−1)
= βT
∗
[u(CT ∗ , HT ∗) + b] + β
T ∗uC(CT ∗ , HT ∗)
1
A
(HT ∗ −HT ∗−1) (3.6)
= 0
It is possible to show that βT
∗
H(T ∗) is the net gain of being alive one more period3.
If the agent stays alive one period more, his gain in utility is βT
∗
[u(CT ∗ , HT ∗) + b], the
sum of the utility derived from consumption and health capital and of the utility of being
alive (b). However, in order to ensure the supplementary consumption (and maintain the
health capital above or equal to the threshold H) induced by the increase of the lifespan,
the agent must reduce its consumption over his life-cycle. The cost, in terms of utility,
is given by βT
∗
uC(CT ∗ , HT ∗)
1
A
(HT ∗ −HT ∗−1) = β
T ∗qT ∗(HT ∗ −HT ∗−1). We underline that
HT ∗ −HT ∗−1 is necessarily negative. At the end of his life, the health capital of the agent
is decreasing, so that βT
∗
qT ∗(HT ∗ −HT ∗−1) < 0. At the optimum, the net gain of being
alive one more period is equal to zero.
This optimality condition is written in terms of utility level, and thus, the constant
term b plays a key role in the tradeoffs made by the agent. To underline the role played
by b assume that b = 0. With our specification of the utility function and assuming σ > 1
(see Hall and Jones (2007)[26]), the condition (3.7) becomes:
1
1− σ
+
γ
CT ∗
1
A
(HT ∗ −HT ∗−1) = 0
All the terms of the above expression are negative. It follows the optimality condition that
3In the continuous time model, this can be shown by differentiating the agent welfare with respect to
T along an optimal path.
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gives the optimal lifespan works only if b > 0 is sufficiently large to ensure a strictly posi-
tive utility. In other words, the parameter b is crucial to obtain a well-posed optimization
problem.
The role of parameter b Here we discuss the role of parameter b and how it determines
the agent’s choices.
As previously mentioned, b is the utility of being alive. An increase in b will provide
incentives to increase lifetime for a given amount of resources. Given the resources con-
straints, the agent should then reduce his consumptions. We consider a simplified version
of Rosen (1988)[42]’s model. The agent is endowed with wealth W and the interest rate
is equal to the time preference rate. We thus use β to compute the sum of discounted
consumption flows in the budget constraint. We also impose that consumption is constant
over time. One has:
T∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σ
1− σ
+ b
]
=
1− βT+1
1− β
[
C1−σ
1− σ
+ b
]
W =
T∑
t=0
βtC =
1− βT+1
1− β
C
Determine now the optimality conditions with respect to C and T , that is:
1− βT+1
1− β
C−σ − λ
1− βT+1
1− β
= 0
−
log(β)βT+1
1− β
[
C1−σ
1− σ
+ b
]
+ λ
log(β)βT+1
1− β
C = 0
λ being the Lagrange multiplier.
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The optimal consumption is given by:
C =
(
σ − 1
σ
) 1
1−σ
b
1
1−σ
Note that C exists only if b > 0 and σ > 1. Let’s differentiate C with respect to b:
∂C
∂b
=
(
σ − 1
σ
) 1
1−σ 1
1− σ
b
1
1−σ
−1 < 0
The optimal value of T is given by:
W =
1− βT+1
1− β
(
σ − 1
σ
) 1
1−σ
b
1
1−σ
It is easy to show that ∂T
∂b
> 0. This example shows clearly the role of parameter b and
what are the tradeoffs made by the agent. An increase in b correspond to an increase in
the utility of being alive. If b increases, the agent chooses to live longer and, knowing that
its wealth is given, reduces his instantaneous consumption.
To finish, we discuss what happens if the agent can invest in health capital. We use
the model with a survival rate of Hall and Jones (2005), which allows to have analytical
results. The agent’s problem writes:
max p(H)U(C)
s.t. Y − C −H ≥ 0
p(H) = Hω, with ω < 1 is the survival rate and Y is the agent’s income.
72
We deduce the following optimality conditions:
p(H)U ′(C)− λ = 0
p′(H)U(C)− λ = 0
Note that the level of utility must be positive, otherwise the second optimality condition
is not consistent.
Let’s define the elasticities ξH = H
p′(H)
p(H)
and ξC = C
U ′(C)
U(C)
. From the optimality
conditions, we deduce:
C
H
=
ξC
ξH
=
ξC
ω
Assuming that ∂C
∂Y
> 0, we determine the effect of an increase in Y on the ratio C
H
. One
gets:
∂
∂Y
(
C
H
)
=
1
ω
∂ξC
∂C
∂C
∂Y
The sign of the above expression depends on the sign of the derivative of the elasticity
ξC . If this elasticity is decreasing in consumption, then, the ratio
C
H
is decreasing in Y .
It follows that the share of health expenditures increases as the income Y increases.
Suppose now that U(C) = C
1−σ
1−σ
+ b. One has:
∂ξC
∂C
=
(1− σ)bC1−σ(
C1−σ
1−σ
+ b
)2
Knowing that σ > 1, the above derivative is negative. It is also easy to check that if b = 0,
ξC = 1− σ. It follows that
C
H
= 1−σ
ω
< 0 and ∂ξC
∂C
= 0. Once again, we can underline that
the importance of parameter b which must be large enough to ensure the existence of a
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solution to the agent’s problem4.
To conclude this paragraph about parameter b. Assuming that σ > 1, we saw,
through several examples, that b must be positive and sufficiently large to ensure the
consistency of a life-cycle model with endogenous life-time (or endogenous survival rate).
Furthermore, b > 0 ensures that the consumption-elasticity of utility is decreasing. It
follows that the share of health expenditures in income increases as income increases.
This is consistent with the data providing evidences that the share of income devoted to
health expenditures increases as income increases.
3.3 Numerical investigations
3.3.1 Calibration strategy
The model is calibrated in order to match US data. The discount factor β is set to
0.96, which correspond to an annual interest rate of 4%. The risk aversion coefficient take
the traditional value of 1.5. As previously discussed, σ must be greater than 1. Parameter
α is the elasticity of income with respect to the health stock. We choose α = 0.15, which is
of the same order as the value of 0.146 estimated by Fonseca et al. (2008)[18]. Parameter
γ (resp. 1 − γ) corresponds to the weight of private consumption (resp. health stock)
in utility. In a static model, this parameter, together with α, determines the share of
consumption (and health spending) in income5. In USA, this share is roughly of 17%
and in France, it is of 11%. Given the retained value of α, a value of γ = 0.95 would be
4If b = 0, the problem has a solution only if σ ∈]0, 1[ and the ratio is constant. The health spending
share is then independent of income.
5Consider the simplified model:
max
C,I,H
(CγH1−γ)1−σ
1− σ
s.t.
{
θHα − C − I = 0 (λ)
AI −H = 0 (µ)
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necessary to obtain (in the static model) a health spending share of 19%. There is no clear
evidences in the literature concerning the numerical value of this parameter. For instance,
Fonseca et al. (2008)[18] set γ = 1 whereas Halliday, He, Ning and Zhang (2017)[27] chose
γ = 0.64. Parameter γ is set at 0.98, which allows to obtain a health spending share close
to 13− 14%. The parameters A and θ are normalized to 1.
Fonseca et al. (2008)[18] assume the health stock is between 0 and 100, in other
words they choose a 0-100 scale. They also report that the health stock decreases from
73.3 at age 26 to 39.7 at age 85. We calibrate the model in ordre to satisfied the same
proportions and we impose H
H−1
= 39.7
73.3
. The level of these variables is set in order to have
an health investment equal to 0 during the first periods (as it is the case in Halliday, He,
Ning and Zhang (2017)[27] and Fonseca et al. (2008)[18]. One has H−1 = 4.1441 and
H = 2.2140. Finally, following Fonseca et al. (2008)[18], the parameters describing the
depreciation of health capital take the values δ1 = 0.035 and δ2 = 0.025. We impose
b = 2.24, so that the agent lifetime is of around 85 years.
The benchmark calibration is summarized in Table 3.1.
β b σ γ α θ A δ1 δ2 H−1 H
0.96 2.24 1.5 0.98 0.15 1 1 0.035 0.025 4.1441 2.2140
Table 3.1: Benchmark calibration
3.3.2 Numerical results
The system of equations characterizing the equilibrium is solved numerically by the
Gauss-Newton algorithm.
Is is easy to determine that:
I
C + I
= 1− γ + γα
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This benchmark calibration gives an optimal T of 59, which corresponds to a lifespan
of 85 years. The share of health spending ( I
C+I
), that is its average value calculated over
the life-cycle, is of 13.91%. French et al. (2017) report that the medical spending of the
last three years represents 16.70% of the US aggregate medical spending. In the other
countries they study, this value is around 20%. As we consider a representative agent over
his life-cycle, we calculate the share of the last 3 years health spending in total health
spending. We find a value of about 10.5%. This value is less than the one reported by
French et al. (2017). However, health spending during the last 3 years of life have a
significant level.
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of main variables
Figure 3.1 presents the evolution of health spending, consumption, health stock and
income over the life-cycle. The health spending is zero around the age of 25. Thereafter,
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the profile of health expenditures is increasing, which is roughly consistent with the data
(see Halliday, He, Ning and Zhang (2017)[27] and Fonseca et al. (2008)[18]). The health
stock is decreasing. However, around the age of 50, the health stock attains its critical
thresholdH. Health spending allows to maintain health stock at this critical level until the
end of life6. The income follows the same trend as the health stock. Finally, consumption is
decreasing. This is obviously due to the decreasing of income and the increasing of health
spending. However, in this class of models, agents wish to smooth their consumption over
their life-cycle. The wish to smooth consumption tends to limit the decreasing trend of
consumption.
Our model is able to reproduce an increasing profile of health spending consistent
with the data. On the other hand, our model does not reproduce the standard hump
shaped profile of income reported in life-cycle literature. Likewise, consumption profil
is less smooth than in a standard life-cycle model. In our framework, there is no finan-
cial market. The agent cannot transfer income over time and consumption cannot be
smoothed. Concerning the income, our model looks like life-cycle models with human
capital and endogenous wage (see Ben-Porath (1967)[5]). This class of model is able to
generate an hump shaped income profile. In our model, the health stock variable plays a
similar role to human capital. We point out two differences. Firstly, we guess the depre-
ciation rate increases with age. Secondly, the elasticity of income with respect to health
capital is, in our benchmark calibration, equal to 0.15. This value is too small to generate
an hump shaped profile of income. A value of around 0.8 would be necessary to obtain
it. Income is less sensitive to health than to education.
6Following Halliday, He, Ning and Zhang (2017)[27] and Fonseca et al. (2008)[18], the health index is
decreasing over the life-cycle. Our results are consistent with their data, except that in our model (and
with our benchmark calibration, the health stock is staying at its critical threshold for about 35 years.
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3.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection, we examine how the numerical results are modified if we change
some key parameters.
The elasticity σ We simulated the model for two other value of σ, that is σ ∈ {1.5; 3; 5}
(Figure 3.2). Recall that 1
σ
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This variable ex-
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Figure 3.2: Elasticity σ
presses the will of the agent to substitute intertemporally consumption (or more precisely,
the “composite good” CγH1−γ). Thus, increasing σ means a reduction of the willingness
of the agent to make intertemporal substitutions. In other word, the agent prefers a
smoother consumption profile. As we want to evaluate the impact of a perturbation of
the elasticity σ on the trade-off made by the agent, the numerator of the utility function
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1−σ is always parametrized using the benchmark value of 1.5. Otherwise, a perturbation
of σ would have effects similar to a change in b.
σ 1.5 3 5
Lifespan 85 63 58
Health spending share 13.91% 8.96% 8.56%
Table 3.2: Elasticity σ
Increasing parameter σ leads to a decrease in the lifespan and in the health spending
share (Table 3.2). This last point is obviously related to the lifespan decrease. A lower
lifespan combined with a lower health stock depreciation mechanically leads to a reduction
in health spending.
Figure 3.2 presents the paths followed by health spending, consumption, health stock
and income for the three values of σ. The increase in σ significantly alters the tradeoffs
made by the agent. The path follows by consumption is smoother as σ increases. A
reduction in the lifespan follows.
The parameter b We consider two alternative values for parameter b, that is b ∈
{2;2.24; 2.5} (Figure 3.3). As previously discussed, this parameter plays a key role in the
determination of the lifespan. The results shown in Table 3.3 point that the lifespan is
increasing relative to b. This quantitative exercise points out that a small perturbation of
parameter b significantly changes the lifespan of the agent. We also observe an increase
in the health spending share. This is obviously related to the lifespan increase and the
increase in the health stock depreciation rate. To live longer, the agent must increase
his health spending share as he gets holder. It follows an increase in the heath spending
share.
Figure 3.3 presents the paths followed by health spending, consumption, health stock
and income for the three values of b. Surprisingly, for each variables, the paths seem to
be superimposed. In other words, the path of a given value of b approximatively extends
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Figure 3.3: Parameter b
b 2 2.24 2.5
Lifespan 50 85 100
Health spending share 4.99% 13.91% 18.52%
Table 3.3: Parameter b
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the one obtained with a smaller value. An increase in b corresponds to an increase in
the utility of being alive. Consequently, the agent is willing to accept a reduction in
consumption to finance health spending in order to stay alive.
The parameter γ We suppose that γ ∈ {0.9;0.98; 1}. Recall this parameter has a
direct impact on the behaviour of the agent in regards to health spending.
The more interesting case is γ = 0.9. Under this value of γ, the agent chooses to
devote a greater share of his expenses to health spending (Table 3.4). The health spending
is then strictly positive from the age of 25 years (Figure 3.4). Recall that with higher
values of γ, there is no health spending around 25 years. The paths followed by the
variables is significantly different from those of the benchmark calibration. During the
first years, consumption is lower with a smoother profile. It follows that the agent invests
in health from 25 years and health stock and income are improved.
γ 0.9 0.98 1
Lifespan 93 85 83
Health spending share 17.92% 13.91% 13.26%
Table 3.4: Parameter γ
The parameter α We suppose that α ∈ {0.12;0.15; 0.18}. This parameter corresponds
to the elasticity of income with respect to health stock. An increase in α obviously means
an improvement of the technology linking health stock and income.
Results of Figure 3.5 show that as α increases, the income path significantly moves
upwards. Consumption and health spending do the same. However, the lifespan and
the health spending share increase moderately as α increases. Thus, an increase in α
essentially modify the level of consumption and health spending.
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Figure 3.4: Parameter γ
α 0.12 0.15 0.18
Lifespan 82 85 88
Health spending share 13.27% 13.91% 14.96%
Table 3.5: Parameter α
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Figure 3.5: Parameter α
3.4 Conclusion
In this article, we study a simplified version of the Grossman[23]’s model. We mainly
follow Laporte (2015)[34] and Strulik (2015)[47]. The agent can allocate his income be-
tween consumption and health spending. The health of the agent is characterized by his
health stock or health capital. The depreciation of the health stock may be compensated
by health spending. The agent stays alive as long as the health stock is above a thresh-
old. One key assumption concerns the depreciation rate of the health stock. Contrarily
to Laporte (2015)[34] and Strulik (2015)[47], we suppose the depreciation rate increases
with age. Finally, we point out that there is no financial market.
We derive the optimality conditions that allow to characterize the solution. The
optimal control problem presents some difficulties. There are two occasionally binding
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constraints (health spending is positive or zero and the health stock is greater than or
equal to the critical threshold) and the depreciation rate of health stock increases with
age. However, the optimality conditions are obtained with an endogenous lifespan, thus
the problem of potential immortality is avoided.
We are able to characterize numerically the solution of the model. The model is
calibrated on the US economy. The model is able to reproduce an increasing profile of
health spending over the life-cycle and a significant share of health spending especially
at the end of life. The profile of some other important variables do not replicate their
empirical counterpart. Likewise, the health stock attains the critical threshold before the
age of 50 and stays at this level until the age of 85. This is due to the assumptions of this
simplified model. For instance, there is no financial market. The agent can not transfer
income through time and cannot smooth its consumption path. Further research should
include a financial market or an hump-shaped profil of income over the life-cycle.
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Chapter 4
A comparison between the US and
France based on a general
equilibrium model
4.1 Introduction
During recent years, the health inequalities have become more and more a severe
issue around the globe. This rise of health inequalities does not only take place in poorer
countries1, but also happens in developed countries: in Britain, the mortality rate of
the richest people is about 15 per 1000 new-births, however, for the poorest people,
the rate rises up to 42 per 1000 new-births (WHO (2008)[13]). In Europe, for middle-
aged individuals who are in the lowest socialeconomic class, the spillover effect of their
mortality risk varies from 25% up to 50%(Mackenbach, Meerding and Kunst (2007)[37]).
The prevalence of long period disability for European males who are older than 80 is
1For example, in India, among the most rich people, the mortality rate of child who are younger than 5
years old is around 50 per 1000 new-births, however, among the most poor people, this rate rises sharply
to around 150 per 1000 new-births.
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about 58.8% for those who only have limited education, versus 40.2% for those who
receive university education(Huisman, Kunst and Mackenbach (2003)[30]).
In this paper, we deal with these health inequalities from a macroeconomic perspec-
tive. Indeed, there exists a large literature on the interactions between socioeconomic
position of the agents and their health status. But, the analysis of the health insurance
system and its implications on the agents wellbeing can be enlightened by general equilib-
rium approaches. Indeed, the share of the health expenditures is large enough to change
the allocation of saving and thus the capital available for the production. On the other
end, the risks on the labour market also provide incentives for selfinsurance, which can
crowd-out the incentives for health insurance. In order to examine contrasting experi-
ences, we choose to apply our model to two countries: the US where the unemployment
insurance and health insurance programs are limited and France where they are generous.
Our objective will be then to evaluate the impact of these public insurance system on the
health expenditures and on health inequalities. Given our general equilibrium approach,
we can also measure their impacts on the efficiency of the allocation.
Despite its generous social security system, France must deal with health inequality
problem. Even if the health status has been improved for a long time, the gap between
different socialeconomic classes has yet enlarged: between 1968 and 1996, the death rate
for people who don’t have a diploma rests unchanged while for those who have an ad-
vanced diploma, it has continuously been improving. This trend continues to our days as
the health inequality continues increasing, because the gap between employees and un-
employed people increases sharply (Louise Potvin (2010)[41]). More precisely, a 35 years
old unemployed male expects to live 28.5 years more while a 35 years-old employee can
expect to live 40 years more. Furthermore, the survey ESPS[17] also reports that 15.8% of
its interviewees declare that they give up spending on health for financial reasons. These
health inequalities occur despite the increase of the weight of Consumption of Health and
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Medical Goods (CHMG) in GDP (from 11.1% in 2006 to 12% in 2014). The percentage
of unhealthy people is slightly higher in America than in France. But the disparities in
health is way larger in America: if we compare the top socioeconomic class with the bot-
tom socioeconomic class, after adjustments, in America, the percentage of healthy people
in the former class is about 1.5 times higher than in the latter one, while in France, it’s
only 1.2 times higher (see Fonseca, Langot, Michaud and Sopraseuth (2018)[19]). The
CDC Health Disparities and Inequalities Report of United States (2013)[40] reports also
that the percentage of poor health agents among workers is about 8.2%, but it’s basi-
cally doubled among agents who experience less than one year unemployed duration but
even tripped among agents who experience longer than one year unemployed duration.
The paradox is that the the share of health expenditures in GDP is larger in the US
than in France, and that this share also increases rapidly, from 12.5% in 2000 to 16.9% in
2016. Hence, this trend doesn’t seem to favor poor people. According to the report Health
Insurance Coverage in the United States(Barnett and Berchick (2017)[6]), though the per-
centage of uninsured people drops to 8.8% in 2016, the percentage of buying additional
private health insurance is still about 67.5% among people who have health insurance
plans.
The objective of this paper is to identify, using a structural model, the main sources
of these health inequalities by taking advantage of the two contrasting experiences of
France and the US. For this purpose, we develop an original extension of the Aiyagari’s
model[3] where besides the labor income risk, an uncertainty on the health status is
introduced. Agents decide to invest or not in health. In order to construct and integrate
this new risk into our model, we follow Titus J.Galama (2008)[22] who argues that the
“optimal health stock” of Grossman (1972)[23] is only an health threshold.2 Thus, only
individuals whose health stocks are below Grossman’s health threshold would invest in
2In the initial model of Galama, the initial health capital is different from the Grossman’s “optimal”
health stock. It is then shown that situations with “excessive” initial health are preferable.
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health. We inherent this idea so that in our model only individuals in bad health have
the need of investing in health. Nevertheless, we take into account that investment in
health only gives a better chance to restore health: it is a risky project. For simplicity
and as in De Nardi, French and Jones (2016)[14] or in Fonseca, Langot, Michaud and
Sopraseuth (2018)[19] , we assume that the benefice of being healthy is directly added in
the utility function. Finally, we do not introduce bonus in wage when individual are in
the good health state, because Eric French (2005)[21] find that the impact of this channel
is negligible.3 For simplicity, we also assume that the health investment is a fixed cost
and thus the generosity of the health insurance system is simply revealed by the gap
between the values of these fix costs among countries: the decision to invest in health
is then a discrete choice, as in search models of the labor market where multiple offers
are available (see e.g. Algan, Hairault, Langot and Chéron (2001)[10]). Finally, empirical
evidences by Florence Jusot[32] show that the health inequality between different social
and economic classes is not only caused by social health gradient or dangerous habits
(alcohol addictive, heavy smoker,etc.), but also by several barriers such as information
barriers, or culture barriers, and most importantly, financial barriers. Hence, we not only
set health investment constant but also we set it really costly for all agents so that not
everyone can afford it. Consequently, agents will choose to invest in health mainly based
on their assets accumulation. The complete history of the agents on the labour market
determines this wealth distribution and thus the heterogeneous financial capacities to
invest in health.
Combining all these factors mentioned above, a general prediction of our model is
that first of all, being healthy permits agents to accumulate wealth but being wealthy
doesn’t necessarily lead to good health, secondly, since health investment is discrete,
there should be a clear boundary that separates agents who choose to invest in health and
3In order to show this result, French (2005)[21] estimates a life-time dynamic structural model of labor
supply, retirement, and saving.
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those who choose not to. Starting from a calibration where the health expenditures are
larger in the US than in France but where the percentage of individuals in good health
is smaller, counterfactual experiments show that larger costs of health care services as
well as higher risky behavior are the main channels that explain these observed data.
It is shown that these determinants of the health market equilibrium (the total cost of
the health service and the subjective value of the health for an individual) dominate the
lower risk of unemployment on the US labor market. Nevertheless, the low unemployment
insurance also contribute to the poor heath of the American. Hence, our results suggest
that the health insurance system must take into account the status of the individual on
the labor market in order to reduce the health inequalities.
The organization of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we present the theoretical
model and the algorithm, in section 3 we discuss the method we use to calibrate different
parameters, especially the ones related to the health risk. Then we present the results,
alongside with their interpretations and intuitions.
4.2 The theoretical model
Individual agents The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived house-
holds and the total population is normalized to 1. At the beginning of the current period,
a household earns an amount of wealth denoted by a. The household is characterized by
an employment status and an health status. Let denote by j the employment status. The
household may be employed (j = e) or unemployed (j = u). The health status is denoted
by h. The household may be in good health (h = g) or in bad health (h = b). To sum up,
at the present time, an agent is characterized by a vector of three state variables (a, j, h).
Job and health status evolve following Markov processes. The process describing the
evolution of the job status is exogenous and is characterized by the following transition
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matrix:

 pie,e pie,u
piu,e piu,u


where pij,j′ is the probability of transition from state j and to state j′ (for j = e, u and
j′ = e, u). One obviously has pij,e + pij,u = 1, with j = e, u. The process describing the
evolution of the health status will be described latter.
The instantaneous utility function of an individual agent includes two additive terms.
The first term is the standard CRRA utility function depending on the individual con-
sumption level. The second term corresponds to an additional utility of being in good
health. One has:
u(c) =
c1−µ − 1
1− µ
+ 1(h = g)× u (4.1)
where µ is the risk aversion coefficient and u denotes the additional amount of utility of
being in good health. Finally, 1() is an indicator function satisfying 1(h = g) = 1.
We now describe the budget constraint. At each period, an agent receives an income
y(j) depending on his job status. One has y(e) = (1 − τ)w and y(u) = b, with w the
wage rate and b the unemployment benefit. The working time of an employed agent is
normalized to 1, in other words, labor supply is inelastic. τ denotes the tax rate or payroll
tax financing the unemployment insurance.
An agent will take the following decisions. He must choose his consumption c and
his asset level a′, and he must decide whether or not to do a fixed health spending d, d
represents the total cost of health spending. This is a discrete choice, the decision variable
is denoted by m. The variable m takes the value of 1 if the agent invests in health and
0 if he chooses to do nothing. If the agent is in bad health, the health investment will
increase the probability of transition to good health. We will discuss this point latter.
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Capital is accumulated by the households. One unit of capital is rented by the
representative firm at the rate R. Furthermore, capital depreciates at rate δ.
We denote by a the present wealth of the agent and by a′ his wealth next period.
The state variables characterizing the present situation of the agent are (a, j, h).
The budget constraint of a state (a, j, h) agent writes:
a′ = y(j) + (1 +R− δ)a− c− 1(m = 1)× d
We also assume that agents face a liquidity constraint in such a way that a′ ≥ 0.
Representative firm Let denote by K the aggregate capital and N the aggregate
employment. There is a representative firm producing a single good, both consumed
and invested, using a constant return-to-scale technology represented by a Cobb-Douglas
production function.
Y = F (K,N) = AKαN1−α
with A > 0 and α ∈]0, 1[. Assume that markets are perfectly competitive, the firm is
price-taker and chooses the amount of factors that maximizes its profits. One has the
following optimality conditions:
∂F (K,N)
∂K
= αAKα−1N1−α = R (4.2)
∂F (K,N)
∂N
= (1− α)AKαN−α = w (4.3)
Aggregate variables N denotes the aggregate employment and U = 1 − N is the
number of unemployed workers. Assume ρ is the replacement rate, one has b = ρw. For a
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given replacement rate, we impose the payroll tax τ adjusts to ensure the balance of the
insurance system, that is:
τwN = b(1−N)
which reduces to:
τ = ρ
1−N
N
(4.4)
As we previously underlined, agents may decide to do or not the health spending d.
The superscripts 1 and 0 respectively point out agents doing and not doing the health
spending. One has:
N = N1 +N0
U = U1 + U0
Let K ′ denotes the next period aggregate capital and C the aggregate consumption.
Let λ(a, j, h) be the density function giving the number of individuals at state (a, j, h).
One has:
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K =
∑
j
∑
h
∫
λ(a, j, h)ada
K ′ =
∑
j
∑
h
∫
λ(a, j, h)a′(a, j, h)da
N =
∑
h
∫
λ(a, e, h)ada
U =
∑
h
∫
λ(a, u, h)ada
C =
∑
j
∑
h
∫
λ(a, j, h)c(a, j, h)da
The aggregation of the individual budget constraints gives:
K ′ = (1− τ)wN + bU + (1 +R− δ)K − (N1 + U1)d
Using the balanced budget constraint of the insurance fund and the firm’s optimality
conditions, one gets:
K ′ = (1− δ)K + Y − (N1 + U1)d
Health status evolution The health status follows a Markov process, however, the
transition probabilities are contingent to the care decisions. One has:

 1(m = 1)pi1g,g + (1− 1(m = 1))pi0g,g 1(m = 1)pi1g,b + (1− 1(m = 1))pi0g,b
1(m = 1)pi1b,g + (1− 1(m = 1))pi
0
b,g 1(m = 1)pi
1
b,b + (1− 1(m = 1))pi
0
b,b


where pimh,h′ denotes the probability of transition if the care decision ism = 0, 1. Additional
assumptions are necessary concerning the probabilities of transition. If the agent is in good
health, health expenditures do not matter. One obviously has pi0g,g = pi
1
g,g and pi
0
g,b = pi
1
g,b.
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If the current status is bad health, the transition probabilities depend on the care decision.
It is natural to admit that pi1b,g > pi
0
b,g and pi
1
b,b < pi
0
b,b. The medical expense increases the
probability to recover good health.
Household program The problem of an individual agent at state (a, j, h) can be writ-
ten recursively. The agent has to choose its consumption level c(a, j, h), its asset level
a′(a, j, h) and to take its care decision m(a, j, h). Given the prices w and R, the household
decisions are solution of the following Bellman equation:
V (a, j, h) = max
a′,c,m
{
c1−µ − 1
1− µ
+ 1(h = g)u+ β
∑
j′
∑
h′
pij,j′pi
m
h,h′V (a
′, j′, h′)
}
(4.5)

−a′ + y(j) + (1 +R− δ)a− c− 1(m = 1)d ≥ 0
a′ ≥ 0
β < 1 is the discount factor.
Stationary equilibrium We only focus on the stationary equilibrium. The model is
solved recursively. We suppose the replacement rate ρ is given and the payroll tax τ is
adjusted each period in order to balance the insurance fund. To begin, we consider a level
aggregate capital K and a level of aggregate employment4 N . Using Eq (4.2), (4.3) and
(4.4), we deduce the rental rate of capital, the wage rate w and the unemployment benefit
b, and thus the income process y(j). Solving the household program (4.5), one gets the
policy rules c = c(a, j, h), a′ = a′(a, j, h) and m = m(a, j, h). Using these policy rules, it
is possible to compute the density function λ(a, j, h) giving the number of agents at state
(a, j, h). Using these density function, a new value of the aggregate capital and of the
4It is easy to show that the stationary level of employment is N =
1−piu,u
1−pie,e+1−piu,u
.
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aggregate employment are computed, that is:
K =
∑
j
∑
h
∫
λ(a, j, h)ada
N =
∑
h
∫
λ(a, e, h)ada
The process is continued until convergence.
Note that one also has:
N1 =
∑
h
∫
1[1 = m(a, e, h)]λ(a, e, h)ada
N0 =
∑
h
∫
(1− 1[1 = m(a, e, h)])λ(a, e, h)ada
U1 =
∑
h
∫
1[1 = m(a, u, h)]λ(a, u, h)ada
U0 =
∑
h
∫
(1− 1[1 = m(a, u, h)])λ(a, u, h)ada
The model is solved using standard numerical methods. The solution method is based
on the discretization of the state space variables. We thus suppose the state variable a
takes its value in a grid A =
{
0, a1, ..., an
}
. One key point is the determination of the
density λ(a, j, h). In the case of a discretized state space (variable a), λ(a, j, h) is given
by the following expression:
λ(a′, j′, h′) =
∑
j∈{e,u}
∑
h∈{g,b}
∑
a|a′=a′(a,j,h)
pij,j′
{
pi1h,h′1[1 = m(a, j, h)]
+ pi0h,h′(1− 1[1 = m(a, j, h)])
}
λ(a, j, h)
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4.3 Calibration and results
The model is calibrated to match the first order moments estimated using historical
data. Under this calibration, we propose to measure the contributions of both health and
labor market structures in the explanation on the contrasting equilibria that summarizes
the French and the US stories.
4.3.1 Calibration strategy
The vector of the model’s parameter is Φ = {Φ1,Φ2} with dim(Φ) = 21. All param-
eters calibrated using external information are:
Φ1 =
{
β, µ, δ, α, {pije,u, pi
j
u,e, ρ
j}j=US,FR
}
dim(Φ1) = 10
The discount factor β is calibrated to match a monthly discount factor consistent with
an annual interest rate of 4%. We set µ that governs the relative risk aversion equals to
2. The depreciation rate of capital (δ) is set such that 8% per year of the used capital
is depreciated. The parameter of the Cobb Douglas production function is equal to 0.3.
The worker flows {pijeu, pi
j
ue}j=US,FR are provided by Shimer (2005)[45] for the US and
by Barnichon, Hairault and Sopraseuth (2015)[25] for France. These worker flows lead
to a unemployment rate equal to 7.22% in the US and 10.26% in France. Finally, we
estimate the replacement rates {ρj}j=US,FR as the gross unemployment replacement rate
in OECD database and follow the results reported by CESifo Groupe (Unemployment
Benefit Replacement Rates,1961-2011, 2012).
β µ δ α pie,u piu,e ρ
France
0.9975 2 8% 0.3
0.016 0.14 0.32
US 0.035 0.45 0.15
Table 4.1: Parameters for France and the US
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For the other parameters, we need some restrictions in order to identify them using a
set of moments computed using French and US data. We take as a reference the GDP of
the US economy, and thus normalize aUS to unity. Hence, 11 parameters are calibrated:
Φ2 =
{
aFR,
{
u¯j, dj, pijg,g, pi
j,1
b,b , pi
j,0
b,b
}
j=US,FR
}
dim(Φ2) = 11
The calibrated parameters are the solution to minΦ2 ||Ψ
theo(Φ2)−Ψ||, where the numerical
solution for Ψtheo(·) is provided by the algorithm based on value function iterations.5. The
11 free parameters are the elements of Φ2, whereas the 11 first-order moments provided
by the data are:
Ψ =
{
Y FR
Y US
,
{
M j
Y j
, pj(H = 0),
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q2)
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1)
,
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q3)
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1)
,
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q4)
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1)
}
j=US,FR
}
with dim(Ψ) = 11.
4.3.2 Results
The solution for the calibrated parameters are reported in Table 4.2. First of all,
good health is more valuated in France than in the US. This result is in accordance with
the less risky behaviors of the French people, in particular in terms of obesity. This is
already underlined by Fonseca, Langot, Michand and Sopraseuth (2017)[19]. Concerning
the efficiency of the health sector, the transition matrices provide the probability gaps to
be cured conditionally to spend money in health. If the agent don’t buy health services,
the risks are characterized by piFRg,g > pi
US
g,g and pi
FR,0
b,b < pi
US,0
b,b . This suggests that for agents
5Value function iteration algorithm applies the contraction mapping theorem. The algorithm is guar-
anteed to converge by this theorem. First, start by making an initial guess for the value function at each
capital point (an initial guess of zero at each point for example). Second, compute the first iteration of
the value function by considering the future value as your initial guess. This yields a new value: the sum
of the current payoff and the discounted (expected) future payoff. Use this value as the future value in
the next iteration to produce a new value, etc... The algorithm stops when the gap between the value
functions of two successive iterations becomes negligible. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000)[36] for more
details on this method.
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who are already in good health, it’s better for them to be in France than in the US, but if
they are in bad health the probability to cure is lower in France. In average, without health
expenditures, the probabilities to be in good health are 58.46% and 48.72% respectively in
France and in the US. If the agent spend money in health services, we have piFR,1b,b > pi
US,1
b,b ,
showing that the probability to cure is higher in the US. This suggests that the efficiency
of the health sector is higher in the US than in France. Remark that for these agents
spending money in health services, the expectations to be in good health are 80% and
79.44% respectively in France and in the US. Our results also show that the costs of health
services are larger in the US than in France: we have dUS > dFR. This is consistent with
previous study of Fonseca, Langot, Michand and Sopraseuth (2017)[19]. Remark that this
gap in the health service costs are also due an higher Out-of-pocket (OOP ) in the US
than in France: in OECD data, we have OOPUS = 13% and OOP FR = 7%.
a u¯ d pig,g pi
1
b,b pi
0
b,b
France 0.0803 2.295 0.01482 0.801 0.19 0.72
US 0.104 2.1 0.0347 0.78 0.15 0.791
Table 4.2: Calibrated parameters for France and the US
The fit of the model is reported in the Table 4.3. We find that almost all moments
we pick match the data, all except one (the percentage of healthy agents in the third
revenue quartile versus the ones in the first revenue quartile), but it’s because the discrete
nature of the decision that agents make. In a discrete choice model, there exists a wealth
threshold for each type of agent (employed and unemployed workers) above which the
optimal decision is to consume health services because they are in bad health. Given
that this expenditure in health services is a fix cost, all the agents above the threshold
have access to the same health services and thus have the same chance to become healthy
agents. Hence, in the model, the population is divided into 2 groups: those who have a low
health risk and those who have a high health risk.6 The equilibrium wealth distributions
6See the appendix D for more detailed statistics on the health gradient.
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France US
model data model data
Y FR/Y US 0.6769 0.666 1 1
M j/Y j 9.82% 10% 14.59% 14.6%
pj(H = 0) 26.48% 28% 30.6 % 30%
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q2)/pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1) 1.1012 1.06 1.1728 1.196
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q3)/pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1) 1.2673 1.17 1.4631 1.337
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q4)/pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1) 1.2688 1.245 1.4741 1.475
Table 4.3: Simulation results for France and the US
displayed in Fig 4.1 show that there exists 2 groups of agents in these economies7: those
we have access to the health services, and those who have not. Hence, the model generates
two health groups. The first one has a low risk to be in bad health and in this case the
probability to cure is high. Hence, whether these agents are in good or bad heath, with
a job or not, are mainly characterized by a amount of assets larger than the threshold
above which they pay the access to the health services. This feature of the equilibrium
wealth distribution also explains why the percentage of healthy agents in the third revenue
quartile does not match the data: in the top two revenue quartiles, all agents are rich
enough to choose to invest in health. Thus the percentage of healthy agents in the third
revenue quartile is rather close to the one in the last revenue quartile but relatively far from
the data showing that our two-states model is too simple to account for this heterogeneity.
4.4 Counterfactual experiments
Given these characteristics of the benchmark equilibria, we can now proceed to coun-
terfactual simulations in order to evaluate the relative contributions of each country-
specific calibration. To this end, we apply six different scenarios starting from the US
case:
(1) The cost of health investment d is the same as the cost in France
7See the appendix E for the general equilibrium on financial market.
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Figure 4.1: Capital Distribution
100
(2) The benefit of being healthy u¯ is the same as the benefit in France
(3) The health risk (the transition matrix ΠH) is the same as in France
(4) The health risk ΠH , the d and the u¯ are all the same as in France
(5) The employment risk (the transition matrix Πe) is the same as in France
(6) The replacement rate ρ is the same as the replacement rate in France
The results are in the Table 4.4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Scenario dFR u¯FR ΠFRH d
FR & ΠFRe ρ
FR US
u¯FR & ΠFRH bench.
p(H = 1) 79.44% 79.27% 60.12% 80.28% 75.5 % 77.5% 69.1 %
p(Buy = 1) 99.99% 99.36% 6.84 % 99.98% 86.55% 92.96% 64.26%
r 0.2395% 0.2458% 0.2449% 0.2373% 0.2296% 0.2474% 0.2459%
Welfare∗ 4.48% 2.92% 2.20% 7.22% -3.65% 0.42% -7.3545
Cons. losses -4.3% -2.9% -2.15% -6.8% 3.79% 0.4% 8.11%
∗ Variations of the welfare relative to the benchmark: ((Welfare(7)-Welfare(x))/Welfare(7))×100
Table 4.4: Counterfactual experiments - US
There are two risks in the economy. The first is the job loss leading to low labor
incomes and the second is the bad health leading to low welfare. Larger income risks
lead the households to save more in order to smooth their consumption. At general
equilibrium, this precautionary saving can reduce the interest rate. But it is not always
the case because the low employment rate reduces the marginal return of the capital.
Obviously these income risks (governed by the matrix Πe) can also be reduced by the
unemployment benefits (ρ). If France is characterized by an higher unemployment risk,
this country is also more generous than the US for the unemployed workers.
Income risks (5). If the French labor market risks are "exported" in the US (column
(6)), there will be more precautionary saving in the US: the US workers must insure
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themselves against this higher risk. Hence, there is more capital supply in the economy.
But, at the same time, the level of employment declines (the unemployment rate is mul-
tiplied by two), leading to a decline in the demand of capital. This last effect dominates:
the interest rate increases and the aggregate production declines. Hence, the higher un-
employment risk is not overcompensated by the increase of the precautionary saving of
the household. There is less wealth in average in this economy than in the benchmark
calibration of the US economy. The surprising result comes from the share of individuals
in good health which increases. This is explained by the longer employment spells when
the labor market transitions of the French economy replace those of the US economy.
In this counterfactual experiment, these long employment spells allow the individuals to
reach the wealth threshold from which the agents choose to buy health services. But, this
cannot compensate the losses in consumption induced by the decline in production: the
welfare is reduced with respect to the benchmark.
Unemployment benefits (6). An increase of the unemployment benefits reduces the
incentives to save and thus the capital amount in the economy because the unemployment
risk being more generously insured by inter-agent transfers. This increases the interest
rate because the capital demand is not affected by the change in unemployment benefits.
This lower level in capital can reduce the welfare. But, this is not the case because the
consumption of health services increases. Indeed, less saving is needed to insurance labor
market risks, then more resources are available for health expenditures. This is the case
and thus more agents are in good health because a larger part of them choose to buy
health services. Thus, the average welfare increases.
Cost of the health services (1). The decrease of d leads a larger set of agents to
invest in health: the risk to be in bad health declines. Numerical results show that the
percentage of healthy agents rise up to the limit. At the same time, more resources are
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available to insure agents against the unemployment risk. Hence, there is more capital in
the economy and thus more production. This allows household to reach a higher welfare.
Welfare benefits induced by good health status (2). In a society where the good
health is more valued (the risky behaviors as obesity more penalized), the incentives
to buy health services increase. Hence, more agents spend in health services and as a
result more people are in good health. The counterpart of these choices is a reduction
of the saving leading to a rise in the interest rate. The impact on the welfare is a priori
undetermined: the direct impact of the rise value of the good health can be compensated
by the decline in the aggregate capital. Numerical results show that the former effect
dominates.
Efficiency of the health sector (3). When the French matrix of the health risks is
implemented in the US economy, the average chance to be in bad health declines. This
largely reduces the incentive to spend money in health services (only 6.84% of people buy
health services). Given the high costs of the health services, agents prefer to play with
the "health lottery" where the medical sector do not take part. Hence, more resources can
be devoted to the saving (the insurance of the income risks) leading the capital stock to
increase (the interest rate declines). At the end, the agents welfare is improved
Cost, welfare benefits and efficiency of the health sector (4). This last scenario
shows that even if the risk to be in bad health is reduced to value for the French economy, a
lower cost of the health services is crucial to provide incentives to spend in health services.
Moreover, the larger utility value of the good health status magnifies this incentive. Hence,
the combination of these three changes in the US economy would allow American people
to have a higher welfare than the French citizens.
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper shows how a general equilibrium model of Aiyagari (1994)[3] augmented
by health care choices in the spirit of the Grossman (1972)[23] can match the US and
France differences, namely the facts that the US the health expenditures are larger than
in France but the percentage of individuals in good health is smaller. Using counterfactual
experiments, it is shown that larger costs of health care services as well as higher risky
behavior are the main channels that explain these results. More precisely, the welfare
gain induced by the a reduction of cost of health service in the US such that it would be
equal to the French one, is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 4.3%.
A reduction of the risky behaviors with respect to health, such that they would be equal
to the French ones, will induce a rise by 2.9% permanent increase in consumption. The
risks associated to the labor market interact with the health status of the individuals. We
show that the large turnover observed in the US induces low investment in health, even if
these turnovers are associated to short periods of unemployment, and low unemployment
rate. Indeed, what matters for the health decision seems to be the stability of the jobs.
These costs in term of health linked to turnover are partially compensated by the higher
employment level allowing to reach a higher production level at the general equilibrium.
Finally, we show that an increase of the unemployment benefits can improve significantly
the health of the American. This rise in the distortion reduces the saving and thus
the production, but this general equilibrium feedback does not compensate the impact
of a more generous unemployment benefit system on health status. Nevertheless, the
determinants of the health market equilibrium (the cost of the health care services and
the risky behaviors) seem to dominate those of labor market.
In future researches, more detailed risks on the labor market must be introduced. It
will be also necessary to to distinguish between health care expenditures that have direct
impact on the life expectancy and those that necessary during periods of dependency.
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Chapter 5
General Conclusion
In this dissertation we study the impacts of health on human life, as mentioned in
the introduction, we start with the deterministic approach, in this approach, we focus
on individual’s heterogeneous behaviours when facing ‘health fluctuations’, then we set
out to the stochastic approach, in this approach, we use the Markov chain to simulate
the uncertain nature of health, we then examine how individuals of different SES would
react to this ‘real’ health risk, finally, we aggregate these behaviours to see the impacts
on the whole economy. Concretely, for the first approach, we construct a simplified
Grossman health capital model with finite and endogenous life horizon, as for the second
approach, we construct an augmented Aiyagari model with stochastic health shocks using
the Markov chain.
In this section, we aim to examine how the questions proposed at the end of the first
chapter are resolved:
Question 1 the possibility of immortality has long been one of the major criticisms to
the Grossman health capital model, so is it possible to have a Grossman health capital
model with a reasonable life horizon?
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Chapter 2 answers this question, we prove that, by adding explicitly a non negative
health spending constraint(i.e. It ≥ 0), a survivability condition(i.e. Ht − H ≥ 0) and
a age-dependant health depreciation function, a simplified Grossman model following
Laporte(2015)[34] and Strulik(2015)[47] can thereafter derive the optimality conditions
that allow to characterize the solution to household’s problem with endogenous lifespan,
thus the possibility of immortality is avoided. In addition, using this model, a numerical
solution can be obtained: we calibrate the model to fit the U.S. economy and we show
that such a model can generate a decreasing health capital profile, an increasing health
spending profile and a significant level of health spending especially at the end of life, but
a non-smooth consumption profile is also obtained, which is mainly because of the lack
of the financial market.
Question 2 Can there be a single framework that can replicate the key macroeconomic
health economic moments of multiple countries?
Chapter 3 answer this question by constructing an augmented Aiyagari model, the
original Aiyagari model includes a stochastic income shock, we extend this model by
introducing a stochastic health shock. The model is proved to be able to fit pretty well
the key macroeconomic moments of French and the U.S., and there is a clear separation
in the demographic distribution between individuals who choose to invest in health and
individuals who choose not to. Plus, with a series of counterfactual experiments, we show
that though the income risk and the health risk are set independently, the former still
interacts with the latter. Empirically, the Americans have a poorer health than French,
we show that the low unemployment risk(shorter period of unemployment)in the U.S.
contributes to explain this phenomenon, for a lower unemployment risk leads to a less
incentive to invest in health. Indeed, what matters for the health decision seems to be
the stability of the jobs. These costs in terms of health linked to turnover are partially
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compensated by the higher employment level allowing to reach a higher production level
at the general equilibrium.
Concerning the impacts of public policies, we show that a French-style health ser-
vice market, which means lower health expenditures and a higher satisfaction of being
healthy(higher utility bonus for being healthy) can improve both the health and the wel-
fare of the American. Indeed, larger costs of health care services as well as higher risky
behaviours in the U.S. are the main channels that explain the poorer health of the Amer-
icans if we compare the 2 countries. More precisely, the welfare gain induced by the a
reduction of cost of health service in the U.S. such that it would be equal to the French
one, is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 4.3%. A reduction of the
risky behaviours with respect to health, such that they would be equal to the French ones,
will induce a rise by 2.9% permanent increase in consumption.
In future researches, we should always continue the study in both approaches: in the
deterministic approach, introduction of financial market should be considered, plus, a real
health shock should be integrated into the model to see its impact on the individual level;
in the stochastic approach, a non-binary health investment choice should be included to
make a more realistic assumption, in addition, we should continue testing the credibility
of the model with more countries, furthermore, other nations like China or Japan could
also be considered to see the differences of health decisions under alien cultures.
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Appendix A
One example of the DEA method
At the core of the DEA methodology is the concept ‘relative efficiency’, and since it’s
‘relative’, the basic idea of this concept is to compare performances of DMUs: first of all,
among all units that are to be studied, the DEA methodology will identify the units that
can be considered as 100% efficient, these units would be thereafter called efficient units
and all other units would be called as inefficient units, secondly, the DEA methodology
will identify for each inefficient unit a reference set of efficient unit(s) that are the closest
to its production function, this reference set of efficient unit(s) are called pairs or peers
to the inefficient unit, for each inefficient unit, pairs could be different, finally, the DEA
methodology compare the performance of each inefficient unit to its pairs and calculate
its relative efficiency score.
The DEA method measures unit’s efficiency by 2 orientations: either input-oriented
or output-oriented. In general, input-oriented DEA method measures how much inputs
one unit could save without reducing its outputs, correspondingly, output-oriented DEA
method measures how much more outputs one unit can producing without using more
inputs.
Let us use an example to illustrate how the DEA methodology functions in practice:
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suppose that there are 5 general clinics, each clinic has its own number of doctors that
would cure different number of patients, their monthly performances are summarised in
the table below
Clinic Doctors cured patients(×100)
A 2 1
B 3 4
C 5 5
D 4 3
E 6 7
Now let us apply the DEA methodology to compare the performances of these 5 clin-
ics, first of all efficient unit(s) needs to be identified, and in order to identify the efficient
unit(s), the DEA methodology uses the ‘efficiency frontier’, note that in general there
are 2 types of ‘efficiency frontier’: a constant return to scale(CRS) efficiency frontier and
a variable return to scale(VRS) efficiency frontier, this distinction also divides the DEA
model into 2 general types: a CRS DEA model(Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978)[9])
and a VRS DEA model(Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984)[4]). Let us draw the per-
formances of the 5 clinics of our example and also the 2 types of ‘efficiency frontier’ and
show the differences under each circumstance.
Figure A.1 shows the efficiency frontier, which is a straight line that goes through
origin and the point B, therefore in this case only clinic B is located on the frontier and
thus considered as an efficient unit, all other clinics are considered as inefficient units. To
calculate the relative efficiency, according to the DEA methodology, there are in general
2 ways, either input-oriented or output-oriented: for an inefficient unit, we compare its
performance to the performance of its pairs, in this case, since only clinic B is considered
as efficient unit, thus we compare the performances of all other clinics to clinic B, the
efficiency of clinic B is 4
3
, which means per unit of inputs used by clinic B would produce
4
3
units of outputs1, or reversely, per unit of outputs that clinic B produces needs 3
4
units
1In our scenario, it means each doctor in clinic B would cure 4
3
× 100 patients per month.
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Figure A.1: CRS DEA efficiency
of inputs2, therefore to compare the performance of an inefficient unit, for example, clinic
A, to the performance of clinic B, either we compare their output efficiency by holding
the same level of input, either we compare their input efficiency by holding the same level
of output. If we take the former approach, then we calculate how much should clinic A
produces with the same level of inputs(2) but with clinic B’s input efficiency(3
4
), that’s
to say, for clinic A, with its 2 doctors, it should have been able to cure 8
3
× 100 patients
per month but in fact it only cures 1 × 100 patients, thus its output efficiency equals to
1
2
3
4
= 3
8
, it is shown in Figure A.1 as point AO, to obtain clinic A’s relative efficiency,
we calculate TA
TAO
= 3
8
, this is what is called the output-oriented efficiency, if we take the
latter approach, then we calculate how much would clinic A expense with the same level
of outputs(1) but with clinic B’s output efficiency(4
3
), that’s to say, for clinic A, with its
current per month cured patients 1× 100, it should have used only 3
4
doctors but in fact
it uses 2, thus its input-efficiency equals to
1
4
3
2
= 3
8
, it is also shown in Figure A.1 as
point AI, to obtain clinic A’s relative efficiency, we calculate SAI
SA
= 3
8
, this is called the
2In our scenario, it means every 100 patients need 3
4
doctor to cure.
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input-oriented efficiency.
As what this example shows, input-oriented efficiency shows how much inputs could
be reduced without affecting the outputs, for example, clinic A has an input-oriented
efficiency of 3
8
, it means to be efficient, clinic A should reduces its number of doctors to
2 × 3
8
= 3
4
while keeping curing 100 patients per month, correspondingly, the output-
oriented efficiency measures how much outputs should be increased without using more
inputs, clinic A has also an output-oriented efficiency of 3
8
, it means to be efficient, clinic
A should increases its monthly cured patients to 13
8
= 8
3
(×100) while keeping its 2 doctors.
Note that under CRS, input-oriented efficiency score is always equal to output-
efficiency score, but this is not the case under VRS efficiency frontier. Figure A.2 shows
the efficiency frontier under VRS of our example, we can see that under VRS, point B is
still located on the frontier, but also point A and point E are on the frontier too, that’s to
say, under VRS, there are more efficient units. To calculate the relative efficiency score of
an inefficient unit, for example clinic D, using the methods we show above, we can obtain
the input-oriented efficiency score of clinic D by UDI
UD
=
8
3
4
= 2
3
and the output-oriented
efficiency score by V D
V DO
= 3
5
. Note that in this case the input-oriented score is differ-
ent from the output-oriented score, which is logic since from Figure A.2 we can see that
when we calculate the input-oriented efficiency score of clinic D, we compare D’s input
efficiency with the performances of A and B, and when we calculate the output-oriented
efficiency score of clinic D, we actually compare D’s output efficiency with B and E, since
the reference set or pairs are different and since AB and BE are 2 different lines with 2
different slopes, it’s only normal that we would obtain 2 different scores.
Now let us combine these 2 efficiency frontiers in order to illustrate the scale efficiency.
In fact, a CRS DEA model is mostly suitable under circumstances that all units are
operating with their optimal size, this obviously refers to the perfect market situation
which is rarely true, correspondingly, a VRS DEA model is often used when all units
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Figure A.2: VRS DEA efficiency
are operating without their optimal size. Obviously, a VRS DEA model is more realistic
than a CRS DEA model but it doesn’t mean that a CRS DEA model is meaningless,
in fact, the DEA efficiency under CRS ‘includes’ that under VRS in the sense that the
former measures the general performance of a DMU and the latter measures only the pure
technical efficiency(e.g. bad performance because of deficient management), therefore the
difference between these 2 is called scale efficiency since it is considered to evaluate DMU’s
inefficiency because of its size. Figure A.3 shows the 2 types of efficiency frontier in one
figure, we can see that clinic B is not only CRS but also VRS efficient, clinic A and E
are VRS but not CRS efficient, clinic D and C are neither VRS nor CRS efficient. The
margin between CRS frontier and VRS frontier could be explained by the scale inefficiency,
that to say the inefficiency caused by unit’s size, in this and the next 2 paragraphs we
only show the inefficiency caused by unit’s input size. as we discuss above, CRS is used
under assumption that all units operate with their optimal size and VRS is used under
assumption that all units operate with non-optimal size, thus for an unit that is VRS
efficient to become CRS efficient, for example clinic A, it needs to modify its size, in
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Figure A.3 we can see that, to become CRS efficient, clinic A needs to move to point
ACI. For an unit who is neither VRS nor CRS efficient, to become CRS efficient, it needs
to be first of all VRS efficient then CRS efficient, in our example, clinic D is neither VRS
nor CRS efficient, from Figure A.3 we can see that first clinic D needs to move to point
DV I to become VRS efficient, then to point DCI to become CRS efficient, the scale
efficiency of clinic D could be therefore calculated by UDCI
UDV I
=
9
4
8
3
= 0.844, which means in
order to become CRS efficient, clinic D should still reduces 15.6% of its inputs even when
become VRS efficient.
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From Figure A.3 we could see that the margin between VRS and CRS efficiency
frontier could be measured by the scale efficiency and thus for units that are not CRS
efficient they need to modify their size in order to become CRS efficient, thus another
question could be asked that is how to modify their size. In this paragraph we still focus on
input-oriented efficiency, Figure A.4 shows different natures of return to scale of different
units, point B is located on both CRS and VRS efficiency frontier, thus for those who
are below point B(point A and point DV I), we can see that the input efficiency at point
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A is lower than that at point DV I(0.5 < 1.12), thus we say that for all units that are in
this area, their production would increase with their size, indicating that they haven’t yet
reach their optimal size, hence for units that are in this area, they need to increase their
production, this is called increasing return to scale(IRS); for units who are above point
B, like point CV I and point E, we see that their input efficiency decreases with their
size(1.25 > 1.17), thus for all units that are in this area, their production would decreases
with their size, indicating that they have already passed their optimal size, hence they
need to decrease their production, this is called decreasing return to scale(DRS).
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Figure A.4: Nature of Return to scale
Last point we want to show with our example is that for an inefficient unit how
it could choose its pairs, as we mentioned above, for an inefficient unit, its pairs is the
reference set of efficient unit(s) who are the closest to its production function, we are
going to use a figure to simply illustrate the strategy, since in our example only under
VRS there are multiple efficient units, thus we are going to show the choose strategy
under VRS efficiency frontier.
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Figure A.5 shows under VRS how to choose its pairs for clinic D an clinic C in terms
of input-oriented efficiency, we can see that for clinic D, the closest efficient units are A
and B, thus we choose A and B as its pairs, for clinic C, the closest efficient units to its
position are B and E, hence we choose B and E as its pairs.
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Appendix B
The DEA methodology
The precedent fictive example gives a general idea of how the DEA methodology
functions, now let us present the formal mathematical formulation of the DEA method-
ology: in general, there are 2 types of DEA models, a CRS DEA model and a VRS DEA
model, the CRS version of DEA model is also frequently called as a CCR model since
it was firstly introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978[9], the VRS version is
usually called as a BCC model since it was presented by Banker, Charnes and Cooper in
1984[4].
B.1 The CCR model
B.1.1 The multiplier form
We will begin with the CCR model, suppose that we have n units and for each unit
k = 1, 2, . . . , n, it produces S outputs yrk with M inputs xik, for each input we assign a
weight vi and for each output we also assign a weight ur, denote hk the efficiency score
for unit k, the objection of DEA is to find the optimal weight solution (u∗, v∗) such that
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the ratio of the weighted output over the weighted input is maximized for DMUk
hk = max
∑S
r=1 uryrk∑M
i=1 vixik
(B.1)
subject to 

u1y1j+u2y2j+···+uSySj
v1x1j+v2x2j+···+vMxMj
≤ 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , n
v1, . . . , vM ≥ 0
u1, . . . , uS ≥ 0
the problem of this formulation is that first of all the solution of this problem seems to
be ambiguous, and second of all, even if was to exist an optimal solution (u∗, v∗), then
because of its fractional programming form, (αu∗, αv∗) would also be optimal for α > 0,
thus the number of solutions would be infinite. To avoid this problem, Charnes, Cooper
and Rhodes propose to transform the model from the fractional programming form to the
linear programming form, the transformation is taken place by imposing that for unit k,
either
∑S
r=1 uryrk = 1 or
∑M
i=1 vixik = 1, the choice depends whether it’s to measure the
input-oriented efficiency or the output-oriented efficiency.
Output-oriented efficiency To measure the output-oriented efficiency, we would want
to minimise the input expensed per unit output produced, thus, with unit’s current quan-
tity of output, maximum output efficiency could be achieved. The linear programming
form of the model is written as
min
M∑
i=1
vixik (B.2)
subject to 

∑M
i=1 vixij −
∑S
r=1 uryrj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , n∑S
r=1 uryrk = 1
v1, . . . , vM ≥ 0
u1, . . . , uS ≥ 0
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this form of the CCR model shows how unit k should minimize its inputs per unit pro-
duced1, exactly as what we did in our example when we were to calculate the output
efficiency of clinic A under CRS, let us show how this form and our example are con-
nected: in our example, there is only one input and one output and we have only 5 units,
thus the linear programming form of our example could be written as
min vxk
subject to 

vxj − uyj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , 5
uyk = 1
v ≥ 0
u ≥ 0
Substitute uyk = 1 into vxj −uyj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , 5, we can have all the possible values
of v 

v ≥ y1
x1
× 1
yk
v ≥ y2
x2
× 1
yk
v ≥ y3
x3
× 1
yk
v ≥ y4
x4
× 1
yk
v ≥ y5
x5
× 1
yk
we want to use this model to calculate the input-oriented efficiency of clinic A, note that
clinic A has 2 doctors that can cure 1(×100)patients per month, therefore we can write
min v × 2
1In fact, it’s actually close to the notion of ’marginal cost’ in economics.
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subject to 

vxj − uyj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , 5
u× 1 = 1
v ≥ 0
u ≥ 0
since we know exactly yj
xj
for j = 1, 2, . . . , 5 and also yk, we can thus calculate all the
possible values of V = [1
2
, 4
3
, 1, 3
4
, 7
6
], then we need to test all these values to see if they can
satisfy that vxj−uyj ≥ 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , 5, after testing, it turns out that this constraint
can be satisfied only when v = 4
3
, this also corresponds to what shows by Figure A.1
that under CRS only clinic B is considered as efficient. Therefore we have v and since we
know already u, we can calculate clinic A’s output-oriented efficiency by 14
3
×2
= 3
8
, which
is equal to the result we showed above.
This form is also called as the ‘multiplier form’, and since it’s a form of linear pro-
gramming, it should also have its dual, which we present in the next section.
This is how we measure unit’s output-oriented efficiency using the DEA methodol-
ogy, it’s called as the output-oriented CCR model because of its envelopment form. We
now continue to show how to measure unit’s input-oriented efficiency, which is rather
straightforward since it follows the very same idea as the output-oriented efficiency, the
only difference is that when we are to measure unit’s input-oriented efficiency, we hold
unit’s weighted input constant.
Input-oriented efficiency To measure unit k’s input-oriented efficiency, we wish to
maximise unit’s output per unit input expensed, the multiplier form of the CCR model
could be written as
max
S∑
r=1
uryrk (B.3)
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subject to 

∑M
i=1 vixij −
∑S
r=1 uryrj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , n∑M
i=1 vixik = 1
v1, . . . , vM ≥ 0
u1, . . . , uS ≥ 0
To see how this form could be used in practice to measure the input efficiency, let us
use again our fictive example: first rewrite the model with 5 units and only 1 input and
1 output, we get
max uyk
subject to 

vxj − uyj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2 . . . , 5
vxk = 1
v ≥ 0
u ≥ 0
Suppose that we want to measure the input efficiency of clinic A, note that thus
xk = 2 and yk = 1, therefore
max u× 1
subject to 

vxj − uyj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2 . . . , 5
v × 2 = 1
v ≥ 0
u ≥ 0
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and we can get all the possible values of u by


u ≤ x1
y1
× 1
2
u ≤ x2
y2
× 1
2
u ≤ x3
y3
× 1
2
u ≤ x4
y4
× 1
2
u ≤ x5
y5
× 1
2
since we know xj
yj
for j = 1, 2, . . . , 5, hence we can obtain all the possible values of
U = [1, 3
8
, 1
2
, 2
3
, 3
7
], obviously only u = 3
8
can satisfy the constraints, thus the optimal
solution of u is u∗ = 3
8
. Therefore we can calculate clinic A’s input-oriented efficiency
score by
3
8
×1
1
= 3
8
, which equals to what we have obtained before.
The multiplier form of the model shows how to maximise k’s outputs per unit of input
expensed. Its dual, the envelopment form, we shall also present it in the next subsection.
B.1.2 The envelopment form
Output-oriented efficiency If output-oriented, the dual of the multiplier form could
be written as
maxφk (B.4)
subject to 

φkyrk −
∑n
j=1 λjyrj ≤ 0 r = 1, . . . , S
xik −
∑n
j=1 λjxij ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . ,M
λj ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , n
where we want to maximise φk but in fact is
1
φk
measures the output-oriented efficiency
of unit k, λj represents the weights of unit j. This form is also called as the ‘envelopment
form’ and it’s actually preferred in terms of compilation because it only has M + S
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constraints instead of n+ 1 constraint as in the ‘multiplier form’.
Up to now, what we present seems to be not connected with the notion pairs, so next
we are going to show how this ‘envelopment form’ could be connected with this notion.
In order to simplify the interpretation, let us suppose that for now there is only 1 input,
therefore the ‘envelopment form’ could be written as
maxφk (B.5)
subject to 

φkyk −
∑n
j=1 λjyj ≤ 0
xik −
∑n
j=1 λjxij ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . ,M
λj ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , n
now make the scaling change of variable λj =
λ′j
yj
and φk =
φ′
k
yk
, then drop the primes and
also the constant 1
yk
, the model could be written as
maxφk =
n∑
j=1
λj (B.6)
subject to 

xik
yk
−
∑n
j=1
xij
yj
λj ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . ,M
λj ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , n
thus we can see the ‘envelopment form’ is transformed into a form in which we seek to
maximise the sum of weights of all units. Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes(1978)[9] propose
this transformation in order to make contact with the work of M.J.Farrel, whose model
could be presented as
maxφk =
n∑
j=1
λj (B.7)
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subject to 

∑n
j=1 Pjλj ≤ Pk
λj ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , n
where Pj =
∑
i
xij
yj
and Pk =
∑
i
xik
yk
This is the example illustrated by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes(1978)[9], in order to
explain its meaning, Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes(1978)[9] use the following figure
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Figure B.1: Envelopment form
Figure B.1 shows a simple example in which there are 6 units, for each unit it has 2
inputs(x1 and x2) and 1 output(y), Figure B.1 shows the input efficiency of each unit per
unit of y produced, for example, unit E needs 4 units of x1 and 1 unit of x2 to produce
1 unit of y, the efficient frontier is composed of line AB and BC and obviously unit E is
not on the frontier, in addition, we can also see that for unit E, the efficient units that
are closest to it are unit B and unit C, thus for unit E, its pairs should be composed of
B and E. The output-oriented efficiency score of unit E could be therefore obtained by
the performance of unit B and of unit E with any adjacent extreme point method(such
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as the simplex or dual methods),
5
6
B +
1
3
C = E (B.8)
i.e. the weight of unit B is λB =
5
6
and the weight of unit E is λE =
1
3
, according to Eq
B.6, φE = λB + λE =
5
6
+ 1
3
= 7
6
, since unit k’s output-oriented efficiency score equals to
1
φk
, thus for unit E, its output-efficiency score equals to 6
7
, indicating that unit E should
have been able to produce 1 unit of output with only 6
7
of the amount of x1 and x2 it
expensed.
Point E ′ is the projection of E on the efficiency frontier, it shows the amount of x1
and x2 unit E should have expensed to produce 1 unit of output in order to be considered
as efficient, to obtain E ′, we can either calculate the intersection between line BC and
line OE, or we can convexify Eq B.8, which we do by dividing Eq B.8 by φE, to get
5
7
B +
2
7
C = E ′ =
6
7
E (B.9)
thus the output-efficiency score of unit E is indeed 6
7
.
We can apply the same method to calculate the output-efficiency score of all inefficient
units, for example, unit D, in fact, by compare unit D’s input efficiency to the input
efficiencies of its pairs A and B, we can obtain its input-oriented efficiency score which
actually also equals to 6
7
, but this doesn’t necessarily mean that unit D and unit E have
the same input-oriented efficiency, because though they do have the same score, their
pairs are different: for unit E, its reference set is composed of B and C, yet for unit D,
its reference set is composed of A and B.
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Input-oriented efficiency If input-oriented, the envelopment form could be written
as
min θk (B.10)
subject to 

yk −
∑n
j=1 λjyj ≤ 0
θkxik −
∑n
j=1 λjxij ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . ,M
λj ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , n
where θk measure unit k’s input-oriented efficiency score.
B.2 The BCC model
B.2.1 The multiplier form
Now we proceed to the VRS version or the BCC model, as what we have shown
above, the biggest difference between the CCR model and the BCC model is that in a
BCC model the efficiency frontier is no longer a straight line, the difference between a
CCR model and a BCC model is measured by the scale efficiency. The setting is pretty
much the same as in the CCR model, we still suppose n units that each of which produces
S outputs yrk with M inputs xik and each output yrk and each input xik are assigned
a weight ur and vi respectively, note that in the BCC model, an unit’s input efficiency
would be different from its output efficiency, thus we will present the problem separately.
Output-oriented efficiency In the BCC model, if it was to measure unit k’s output
efficiency score, the problem could be written as
hk = max
∑S
r=1 uryrk∑M
i=1 vixik − ck
(B.11)
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subject to 

∑S
r=1 uryrj∑M
i=1 vixij−ck
≤ 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , n
v1, . . . , vM ≥ 0
u1, . . . , uS ≥ 0
where ck is free in sign, we will explain its role later.
The objective is always to maximise the ratio between the weighted output and the
weighted input. Once again, the same problem of fractional programming form emerges,
in order to avoid this problem, we need to transform this fractional programming form
into a linear programming form, which could be written as
min
M∑
i=1
vixik − ck (B.12)
subject to 

∑M
i=1 vixij −
∑S
r=1 uryrj − ck ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , n∑S
r=1 uryrk = 1
v1, . . . , vM ≥ 0
u1, . . . , uS ≥ 0
this is essentially the same thing as what we have shown in the CCR model, except the
term ck, now let us use our fictive example to show how to use this form to calculate the
output-oriented efficiency score of unit k. Since in our example there is only 1 input and
1 output, thus the model above could be rewritten as
min vxk − ck
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subject to 

vxj − uyj − ck ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , 5
uyk = 1
v ≥ 0
u ≥ 0
substitute uyk = 1 into vxj − uyj − ck ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , 5 we get


vx1 − ck ≥
y1
yk
vx2 − ck ≥
y2
yk
vx3 − ck ≥
y3
yk
vx4 − ck ≥
y4
yk
vx5 − ck ≥
y5
yk
Suppose that we want to calculate the output efficiency score of clinic D, recall that
clinic D has 4 doctors and cure 3(×100)patients per month, thus xk = 4 and yk = 3, thus
the problem could be written as
min v × 4− ck
subject to 

vxj − uyj − ck ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , 5
u× 3 = 1
v ≥ 0
u ≥ 0
since we know yj
yk
for j = 1, 2, . . . , 5 and also xj for j = 1, 2, . . . , 5, thus we can obtain all
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the possible values of v and ck by


2v − ck ≥
1
3
3v − ck ≥
4
3
5v − ck ≥
5
3
4v − ck ≥
3
3
6v − ck ≥
7
3
Resolving these inequations, we can have all the possible values of v and ck that
satisfy the constraints, which are summarized in the table below
4v − ck
v = 2
3
ck =
2
3
2
v = 1
3
ck = −
1
3
5
3
v = 1
2
ck = −
1
6
11
6
v = 1
6
ck = −
4
3
2
v = 4
9
ck = 0
16
9
v = 1 ck = −
5
3
7
3
It’s obvious that the optimal solution for ck and v are v∗ =
1
3
and c∗k = −
1
3
. Thus we
can calculate the output efficiency score of clinic D by h = 15
3
= 3
5
, which equals to the
result we have obtained before.
Note that the optimal solution gives us ck = −
1
3
. In this linear programming form
ck indicates the nature of return of scale of unit k, the rules are:
• if ck > 0, then unit k is of nature IRS;
• if ck = 0, then unit k is of nature CRS;
• if ck < 0, then unit k is of nature DRS
in our case ck is negative, therefore clinic D is DRS in terms of output efficiency.
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Like in the CCR model, in the BCC model, this linear programming form is also
called as the multiplier form, and its dual is also called as the envelopment form, which
we present in detail in the next section.
Input-oriented efficiency Similar to the output-oriented efficiency, in the BCC model,
the input-oriented efficiency problem could be presented as
hk = max
∑S
r=1 uryrk + ck∑M
i=1 vixik
(B.13)
subject to 

∑S
r=1 uryrj+ck∑M
i=1 vixij
≤ 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , n
v1, . . . , vM ≥ 0
u1, . . . , uS ≥ 0
where ck is always free in sign.
The multiplier form of this problem could be written as
max
S∑
r=1
uryrk + ck (B.14)
subject to 

∑S
r=1 uryrj −
∑M
i=1 vixij + ck ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , n∑M
i=1 vixik = 1
v1, . . . , vM ≥ 0
u1, . . . , uS ≥ 0
Now let us see how can we use this form in our example: with 1 input and 1 output,
the model could be rewritten as
max uyk + ck
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subject to 

uyj − vxj + ck ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , 5
uyk = 1
v ≥ 0
u ≥ 0
substitute uyk = 1 into uyj − vxj + ck ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , 5 we get


uy1 + ck ≤
x1
xk
uy2 + ck ≤
x2
xk
uy3 + ck ≤
x3
xk
uy4 + ck ≤
x4
xk
uy5 + ck ≤
x5
xk
We want to measure the input efficiency of clinic D, hence xk = 4 and yk = 3, we
can write
max u× 3 + ck
subject to 

uyj − vxj + ck ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , 5
v × 4 = 1
v ≥ 0
u ≥ 0
since we know xj
xk
for j = 1, 2, . . . , 5 and also yj for j = 1, 2, . . . , 5, thus we can obtain all
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the possible values of u and ck by


u+ ck ≤
2
4
4u+ ck ≤
3
4
5u+ ck ≤
5
4
3u+ ck ≤
4
4
7u+ ck ≤
7
4
Resolving these inequations, we can have all the possible values of u and ck that
satisfy the constraints, which are summarized in the table below
3u+ ck
u = 1
8
ck =
1
4
5
8
u = 1
4
ck = −
1
4
1
2
u = 1
6
ck =
1
12
7
12
u = 1
2
ck = −2 −
1
2
u = 3
16
ck = 0
9
16
u = 1
12
ck =
5
12
2
3
Obviously the optimal solution for u and ck are u∗ =
1
12
and c∗k =
5
12
. Thus the
input-oriented efficiency of clinic D is h =
3× 1
12
+ 5
12
1
= 2
3
, which equals to the results we
have obtained before.
Here we can also detect the nature of unit k’s return to scale by judging the sign of
ck, the rules are exactly the same as in the output efficiency case. In our example clinic
D has a c∗k > 0, thus it’s of nature IRS in terms of input-oriented efficiency.
The dual of this form, the envelopment form, we present it in detail in the next
section.
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B.2.2 The envelopment form
Output-oriented efficiency In the BCC model, if output-oriented, the envelopment
form could be written as
maxφk (B.15)
subject to 

φkyk −
∑n
j=1 λjyj ≤ 0
xik −
∑n
j=1 λjxij ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . ,M∑n
j=1 λj = 1
λj ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , n
where we want to maximise φk but is
1
φk
that measures the output-oriented efficiency. We
can also see that there is a new constraint
∑n
j=1 λj = 1, this is the convexity constraint.
Input-oriented efficiency If input-oriented, the envelopment form could be written
as
min θk (B.16)
subject to 

yk −
∑n
j=1 λjyj ≤ 0
θkxik −
∑n
j=1 λjxij ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . ,M∑n
j=1 λj = 1
λj ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , n
where θk measures the input-oriented efficiency score of unit k, note that there is also the
convexity constraint
∑n
j=1 λj = 1.
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Appendix C
Input-oriented and output-oriented
efficiency score
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Country CRS Input oriented Output oriented
VRS Peers Rank VRS Peers Rank
Australia AUT 0.76 0.76 IRL 16 0.986 JPN 14
Belgium BEL 0.764 0.767 IRL 15 0.982 JPN 17
Canada CAN 0.823 0.827 LUX/IRL 10 0.988 CHE/JPN 11
Denmark DNK 0.679 0.684 IRL 20 0.979 JPN 19
Finland FIN 0.954 0.956 IRL 6 0.994 CHE/JPN 7
France FRA 0.694 0.741 CHE/LUX 17 0.992 JPN 9
Germany DEU 0.71 0.711 IRL 18 0.985 JPN 16
Greece GRC 0.952 0.954 IRL 7 0.994 LUX/CHE 7
Ireland IRL 1 1 IRL 1 1 IRL 1
Italy ITA 0.856 0.932 LUX/CHE 8 0.996 JPN/CHE 6
Japan JPN 0.782 1 JPN 1 1 JPN 1
Luxembourg LUX 0.968 1 LUX 1 1 LUX 1
Netherlands NLD 0.682 0.69 LUX/IRL 19 0.987 JPN 13
Norway NOR 0.789 0.802 LUX/IRL 13 0.988 CHE/JPN 11
Portugal PRT 0.866 0.873 IRL 9 0.982 CHE/JPN 17
Spain ESP 0.929 0.993 LUX/CHE 5 0.999 CHE/LUX 5
Sweden SWE 0.757 0.805 LUX/CHE 12 0.991 JPN 10
Switzerland CHE 0.884 1 CHE 1 1 CHE 1
United Kingdom GBR 0.806 0.807 IRL 11 0.986 JPN/CHE 14
United states USA 0.76 0.77 IRL 14 0.972 JPN 20
Table C.1: Input-oriented and output-oriented efficiency scores of OECD countries,
Afonso and Kazemi (2017)[1]
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Country Efficiency score Peers Return to scale Referencing frequency
Australia 0.8095 Chile; Decreasing 0
Iceland;
Slovenia
Austria 0.5212 Chile; Deceasing 0
Estonia;
Iceland
Belgium 0.8138 Chile; Decreasing 0
Korea;
Slovenia
Canada 0.9835 Chile; Decreasing 0
Iceland;
Ireland
Chile 1 Constant 17
Czech Republic 0.8311 Estonia 0
Korea;
Slovenia;
Turkey
Denmark 0.7891 Chile; Increasing 0
Iceland;
Sweden
Estonia 1 Constant 5
Finland 0.8242 Iceland; Increasing 0
Korea;
Slovenia
France 0.7393 Chile; Decreasing 0
Korea;
Slovenia
Germany 0.6099 Chile; Decreasing 0
Korea;
Slovenia
Greece 0.8083 Estonia; Decreasing 0
Israel;
Turkey
Hungary 0.7533 Estonia; Increasing 0
Poland;
Turkey
Iceland 1 Constant 12
Ireland 1 Constant 4
Israel 1 Constant 3
(Continued)
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Country Efficiency score Peers Return to scale Referencing frequency
Italy 0.8843 Chile; Decreasing 0
Iceland;
Israel
Japan 1 Constant 0
Korea 1 Constant 7
Luxembourg 0.8008 Chile; Decreasing 0
Korea;
Slovenia
Mexico 1 Constant 0
Netherlands 0.8354 Chile; Decreasing 0
Ireland;
Slovenia
New Zealand 0.9031 Chile; Decreasing 0
Iceland;
Sweden
Norway 0.8859 Chile; Increasing 0
Iceland;
Sweden
Poland 1 Constant 1
Portugal 0.9329 Chile; Increasing 0
Iceland;
Israel
Slovakia 0.7089 Estonia; Increasing 0
Korea;
Slovenia;
Turkey
Slovenia 1 Constant 11
Spain 0.9188 Chile; Decreasing 0
Iceland;
Sweden
Sweden 1 Constant 5
Switzerland 0.6954 Chile; Decreasing 0
Ireland;
Slovenia
Turkey 1 Constant 4
UK 0.9161 Chile; Decreasing 0
Iceland;
Sweden
USA 0.7823 Chile; Increasing 0
Iceland;
Ireland;
Table C.2: CCR efficiency scores of OECD countries, Cetin and Bahce (2016)[8]
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Country BCC ARG Country BCC ARG
Australia 0.996 0.776 Japan 1 0.992
Austria 0.98 0.769 South Korea 1 0.994
Belgium 0.972 0.699 Luxembourg 1 1
Canada 1 0.801 Mexico 1 1
Chile 1 1 Netherlands 0.981 0.771
Czech Republic 0.945 0.872 New Zealand 1 0.973
Denmark 0.965 0.756 Norway 0.992 0.929
Estonia 0.903 0.682 Poland 0.936 0.727
Finland 0.980 0.886 Portugal 0.974 0.955
France 0.987 0.771 Slovak Republic 0.916 0.627
Germany 0.975 0.727 Slovenia 0.983 0.975
Greece 1 1 Spain 1 1
Hungary 0.903 0.652 Sweden 1 1
Iceland 0.997 0.869 Switzerland 1 0.693
Ireland 0.978 0.728 Turkey 0.940 0.632
Israel 0.995 0.910 UK 0.982 0.786
Italy 1 0.934 USA 0.964 0.698
Table C.3: Output-oriented efficiency scores of OECD countries, 2008, Önen and Sayin
(2018)[39]
Country BCC ARG Country BCC ARG
Australia 0.995 0.673 Japan 1 1
Austria 0.978 0.730 South Korea 1 1
Belgium 0.976 0.611 Luxembourg 0.990 0.777
Canada 1 0.676 Mexico 1 1
Chile 1 1 Netherlands 0.981 0.5651
Czech Republic 0.945 0.794 New Zealand 0.993 0.575
Denmark 0.969 0.572 Norway 0.982 0.657
Estonia 0.928 0.756 Poland 0.950 0.730
Finland 0.976 0.751 Portugal 0.975 0.864
France 0.991 0.658 Slovak Republic 0.925 0.591
Germany 0.975 0.598 Slovenia 1 1
Greece 1 1 Spain 1 1
Hungary 0.913 0.623 Sweden 1 0.832
Iceland 1 1 Switzerland 0.997 0.523
Ireland 0.991 0.732 Turkey 1 1
Israel 1 0.970 UK 0.992 0.722
Italy 0.997 0.915 USA 0.966 0.565
Table C.4: Output-oriented efficiency scores of OECD countries, 2012, Önen and Sayin
(2018)[39]
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Appendix D
The Health Gradient
France US
model data model data
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q1) 63.34% 65 % 54.31% 55.95%
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q2) 69.59% 68.9 % 63.69% 66.9 %
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q3) 80.28% 76.05 % 79.46% 74.8 %
pj(H = 1|I ∈ Q4) 80.45% 80.925% 80.06% 82.5 %
Table D.1: Percentage of agents in good health by income quartiles - France and US
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Appendix E
Equilibrium on financial markets
For each simulation we check if the equilibrium interest rate is below the time prefer-
ence rate. The two panels of the Fig E.1 represent the general equilibrium point for the 2
benchmark simulations. In either case, the general equilibrium interest rate is well below
the time preference rate.
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(a) General Equilibrium for France
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(b) Capital Distribution for USA
Figure E.1: General Equilibrium
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